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Abstract 
In the field of marketing a number of theories compete for recognition, academic sup-
port and theoretical credibility. There are e.g. approaches from such diverse fields as 
economics, psychology and sociology. All in all, research on marketing is highly 
fragmented. The work at hand is a study on possibilities and obstacles of promoting 
“Austrian economics” – which emphasises the coordinating role of information 
(mostly via price-signals) in dynamic markets – as a general marketing-theory. 
At first, this thesis describes different concepts and problems toward marketing and 
marketing-theory. Then, epistemological principles and criteria towards marketing 
theories are discussed and the properties of Austrian economics in regard to market-
ing are shown. In the second half the epistemological criteria are applied on Austrian 
economics. 
In a Popperian framework Austrian economics suffers from certain weaknesses. Its 
immunization tendencies are an obstacle to empirical testing of its assumptions. 
However, Austrian economics offers important insights: Especially the descriptive 
and explicative properties of Austrian economics that are fruitful for marketing-
theory. Without marketing, the market process would come to a halt in a state of dis-
equilibrium. It is the informational role of marketing that improves the choices of 
alert consumers.  
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Abstract 
Im Marketing konkurrieren eine Reihe von Theorien um Aufmerksamkeit, Unterstüt-
zung durch akademische Forschung und theoretische Glaubwürdigkeit. Es gibt z.B. 
Ansätze aus so unterschiedlichen Bereichen wie der Volkswirtschaftslehre, Psycholo-
gie und Soziologie. Alles in allem ist die Marketing-Forschung stark zersplittert. Die 
vorliegende Arbeit behandelt die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Marktprozesstheo-
rie (Österreichische Schule der Nationalökonomie) – eine Theorie, die die Rolle der 
Information (hauptsächlich durch Preissignale) bei der Koordinierung in dynamischen 
Märkten betont – als allgemeine Marketingtheorie. 
Zuerst beschreibt diese Diplomarbeit verschiedene Konzepte und Probleme des Mar-
ketings und der Marketingtheorie. Danach werden wissenschaftstheoretische Prinzi-
pien und Kriterien, die an Marketingtheorien gestellt werden, diskutiert. Die für das 
Marketing relevanten Eigenschaften der Marktprozesstheorie werden vorgestellt. In 
der zweiten Hälfte der Arbeit wird die Marktprozesstheorie in Bezug auf die darge-
legten wissenschaftstheoretischen Kriterien analysiert. 
Im Popper’schen Sinn zeigt die Marktprozesstheorie Schwächen. Immunisierungs-
tendenzen verhindern empirische Tests ihrer Annahmen. Trotzdem vermittelt die 
Marktprozesstheorie wichtige Einsichten: Die Informationsfunktion des Marktetings 
ist für verbesserte Entscheidungen der Konsumenten verantwortlich. Insbesondere die 
Fähigkeit zu beschreiben und zu erklären macht die Marktprozesstheorie fruchtbar für 
die Marketingtheorie. Ohne den Einsatz des Marketings würde der Marktprozess in 
einem Ungleichgewicht zum Stillstand kommen. 
 
 
Schlagwörter: Marketingtheorie, Marktprozesstheorie, Marketing, Österreichische 
Schule der Nationalökonomie 
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“Eritis sicut Deus, scientes bonum et malum” 
Genesis 3.5 
1 Introduction to the Problem 
The common perception of marketing is that of an interdisciplinary field comprising 
knowledge from diverse fields of science, like business administration, sociology and 
mathematics.1 Despite – or probably because of this diversity – there have been ex-
tensive complaints about a deficit concerning the scientific status and the theoretical 
foundation of marketing.2 Even though Meffert’s call for a general marketing theory 
has only been one in a long row starting in the 1940s,3 marketing is still in a state of 
unresolved coexistence of theories, and in danger that the different schools of thought 
ignore each other.4 In this state of affairs the introduction of a general marketing the-
ory is not only an academic “red herring” and a matter of “status seeking” that has the 
sole purpose of underpinning the scientific status of marketing.5 Sheth, Gardner and 
Garrett offer three reasons why a general marketing theory is advantageous: first it 
could serve as a reference point for the fragmented scientific community. Theorists 
pursuing a limited theory in a narrow area would be encouraged to relate their find-
ings to the general theory. Second, a general theory would help to overcome the iden-
tity crisis of marketing. Third, a general theory built on sound foundations would 
strengthen the credibility of marketing science with practitioners.6 Rese calls for a 
microeconomic theory of marketing, a theory that would refer to individual actions 
employing assumptions that basically reflect the characteristics of market actors. 
Meffert’s rediscovery of the economic core in current marketing theory is encourag-
ing, as well.7 Austrian economics could be the foundation for the development of a 
comprehensive marketing theory.8 Adopting and refining this microeconomic theory 
for marketing is contrary to Bartels, who suggests integrating seven sub-theories into 
a genuine general theory of marketing.9 A genuine general marketing theory has not 
yet been developed, so the adoption of Austrian economics could be worthwhile. 
Among others, Backhaus sees a close resemblance between Austrian economics and 
                                                 
1 Cf. Chmielewicz (1988), p. 450. 
2 Cf. Rese (2000), p. 214; critically e.g. Schneider (1983a) and (1983b); attacking Schneider cf. Dichtl 
(1983); favourably e.g. Leong (1985), p. 32. 
3 Meffert (2000), pp. 333f. 
4 Cf. Kaas (2000), p. 73. 
5 Cf. Buzzell (1963), p. 36. 
6 Cf. Sheth/Gardner/Garrett (1988), p. 18; El-Ansary (1979), p. 399. 
7 Meffert (2000), pp. 333f. 
8 Cf. Rese (2000), pp. 214-216. 
9 Cf. Bartels (1968), p. 32. 
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many issues of marketing.10 Schneider condemns both behaviourism and equilibrium 
thinking in marketing. Instead, he also suggests building the theoretical foundations 
of marketing on market processes, the role of entrepreneurs in competition and the 
informational role of markets.11 Since marketing is a dynamic process, any marketing 
theory should account for this fact, even though most existing marketing concepts are 
more or less static.12 Austrian economics can be this alternative to static theories: 
“[…] [C]ompetition is presented as a dynamic process, driven by alert entrepreneurs 
who creatively seek and use their market chances […]”.13 Austrianism goes well be-
yond price theory and refers to product policy, advertising, and sales-efforts, too.14 
Additionally, it is not only possible to trace the origins of marketing back to the ‘Aus-
trian school of economics’ at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, 
but also to see important impacts on the ideas of marketing thinkers like Alderson and 
economists as in Porter’s concept of generic strategies for achieving competitive 
advantage.15 But despite its long history, thinking in market processes could not yet 
leave its outsider-status in business- and marketing science yet.16 Under these prem-
ises, an attempt to evaluate Austrian economics as a high-level explanation of market-
ing seems to be inevitable. It is claimed that “[t]he Austrian takes a position midway 
between that of the behaviourist and […] neoclassicism”.17 The analysis put forward 
analyses if this middle position of Austrian economics, in regard to research about 
Austrian economics in marketing,18 holds integrative, descriptive and prescriptive, 
and generally explanatory powers for marketing theory. 
The work on hand is structured as follows: The subsequent chapter two is an over-
view of the current state of marketing theory. The purposes, sources and problems of 
marketing and marketing theory are laid out, as well as reasons why a general market-
ing theory is both necessary and useful. Chapter three sets the epistemological foun-
dations for the analysis. It puts forward basics from the philosophy of science. The 
qualities of Austrian economics will be later evaluated in regard to these epistemo-
                                                 
10 Cf. Backhaus (2000), pp. 4f. 
11 Cf. Schneider (1983a), p. 198. 
12 Cf. Sheth/Gardner/Garrett (1988), p. 194; Mattmüller/Tunder (1999), p. 443. 
13 Fritz (1990), p. 496; [„[…] Wettbewerb als ein dynamischer Prozess, der von wachsamen Unter-
nehmern in Gang gehalten wird, die kreativ ihre Marktchancen suchen und nutzen […]“]. 
14 Cf. Fritz (1990), pp. 496f.; cf. e.g. Kirzner (1973), chapter 4, pp. 135-186. 
15 Cf. Kleinaltenkamp/Jacob (2002), p. 149; Alderson (1957); Porter (1985). 
16 Cf. Schneider (1983a), p. 216. 
17 Block (1999), p. 24. 
18 Cf. e.g. Kirkpatrick (1983); Block/Barnett II/Wood (2002); Meyer (1997). 
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logical foundations. Chapter four describes the fundamental assumptions and the 
working of the market process in Austrian economics. Chapter five contains the main 
analysis. The epistemological criteria of Austrian economics are critically evaluated, 
its applicability as a marketing theory, and the potential of deriving implications for 
marketing from Austrianism. Finally, conclusions and a summary are put forward in 
chapter six. 
 
2 The State of Marketing Theory in Absence of a General Theory 
2.1 The Scope of Marketing and Objectives of Marketing Theory 
Despite long-lasting discussions about the content of marketing, its core is still con-
troversial.19 One definition claims that “[m]arketing means […] planning, coordina-
tion and control of all activities towards current and potential markets. The goals of 
the company are to be reached through constant satisfaction of customer needs 
[…]”.20 The American Marketing Association (AMA) defines marketing as “[…] the 
process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion and distribution 
of ideas, goods and services to create exchanges that satisfy individual and organiza-
tional objectives”.21 Still another definition claims that “[m]arketing is a social and 
managerial process by which individuals and groups obtain what they need and want 
through creating, offering and exchanging products of value with others”.22 Market-
ing need not be ashamed of this diversity of definitions since the much older disci-
pline of philosophy has not even developed consensus on a commonly accepted defi-
nition.23 Traditionally, the term ‘marketing’ refers to acts of buying and selling in a 
market.24 This is also the underlying rationale of all the former statements: that two or 
more parties engage in an exchange of resources.25 Transactions occur only if the 
force of marketing brings the producers and consumers who are parties to a potential 
                                                 
19 Cf. Backhaus (2003), p. 6. 
20 Meffert (1998), p. 7; [„Marketing bedeutet […] Planung, Koordination und Kontrolle aller auf die 
aktuellen und potentiellen Märkte ausgerichteten Unternehmensaktivitäten. Durch eine dauerhafte 
Befriedigung der Kundenbedürfnisse sollen die Unternehmensziele […] verwirklicht werden“]. 
21 Brown (1985), p. 1. 
22 Kotler/Bliemel (1999), p. 8; [“Marketing ist ein Prozess im Wirtschafts- und Sozialgefüge, durch 
den Einzelpersonen und Gruppen ihre Bedürfnisse und Wünsche befriedigen, indem sie Produkte und 
andere Dinge von Wert erzeugen, anbieten und miteinander austauschen“]. 
23 Cf. Hunt (1976), p. 24. 
24 Cf. Dixon (2002), p. 88. 
25 Cf. Engelhardt (1998), pp. 11f. 
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exchange, which were only in a lose relationship before, into contact.26 Then it can be 
said that the essence of marketing relates to the structuring and organizing of the ex-
change,27 e.g. through manipulation of the marketing mix variables, the so-called ‘4 
P’s’ product, price, place (distribution), and promotion.28 A newer extension of mar-
keting puts an emphasis on relationships, in which the creation of customer satisfac-
tion is the first step to create loyalty, since it is often easier and cheaper to keep exist-
ing customers than to find new ones. The former policy is more profitable, as well.29 
Exchanges are not static, but processes subject to the dimension of time. The ex-
change itself is only the culmination of activities that are directed towards it.30 The 
execution of an exchange transaction depends on the parties involved, especially their 
agreement on the terms of trade. Exchanges will only take place if they enhance (or at 
least do not deteriorate) the situation ex ante.31 When in the 1960s demand became 
the bottleneck of businesses, companies needed to focus on customer demands.32 
Marketing became responsible for finding and satisfying potential and actual desires 
of consumers.33 Goods or services that solve customer-problems have to be offered.34 
The marketing-driven company will only succeed and engage in an exchange with a 
consumer if the offer it makes is better than the offers made by all relevant competi-
tors.35 
A science like business administration and its subfield marketing are not confined to 
description, but open to find explanations, prognoses and decision rules to enhance 
our lives. 36 In order to do that, a theoretical background is of principle necessity.37 
The AMA formally recognized the need for marketing theory for the first time in 
1946.38 In the 1970s Ryans, Van’t Spijker and Bergin conducted an empirical study 
on the need for a theoretical background of marketing and found extensive support 
among marketing academicians and practitioners. Out of their sample 90 per cent 
agreed that the quest for theory in marketing is a worthwhile objective. Furthermore, 
                                                 
26 Cf. McInnes (1964), pp. 56f. 
27 Cf. Arndt (1983), p. 44.  
28 Cf. Kotler (1972), p. 52. 
29 Cf. Meffert (1999), p. 41; Kotler/Bliemel (1999), S. 71; Anderson/Sullivan (1993). 
30 Cf. Plinke (2000a), p. 15. 
31 Cf. Kotler/Bliemel (1999), p. 12. 
32 Cf. Keith (1960), p. 35. 
33 Cf. Keith (1960), p. 37; Levitt (1960), p. 50. 
34 Cf. Alderson (1957), p. 164; Plinke (2000b), p. 127. 
35 Cf. Plinke (1992), pp. 835f. 
36 Cf. Kaas (2000), p. 57. 
37 Cf. Raffée (1984), p. 13. 
38 Cf. Bartels (1970), p. 18. 
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72.5 per cent of their sample of marketing leaders agreed that the pursuit of a general 
marketing theory would be a good idea.39 Theory roughly means systematic explana-
tion; it is “a structure that describes the workings and interrelations of the various 
aspects of some phenomenon”.40 It is widely accepted41 that marketing theory should 
describe and explain two phenomena: 
(1) Why do people and organizations engage in exchange relations? 
(2) How are exchanges created, resolved, or avoided?42  
The basic explananda of marketing theory can be derived out of these questions:  
(1) The behaviour of buyers directed at accomplishing exchanges. 
(2) The behaviour of sellers directed at accomplishing exchanges. 
(3) The institutional framework directed at accomplishing and/or facilitating ex-
changes. 
(4) Consequences for society of the behaviour of the buyer, seller, and the institu-
tional framework directed at accomplishing and/or facilitating exchanges.43 
The capability to develop solutions to the problem of shaping well-founded exchange 
relationships has been called the ‘core competency’ of marketing theory.44 This core 
competency is not necessarily confined to commercial exchanges or exchanges of 
consumer goods. The scope of marketing is defined rather broadly, and current mar-
keting theory is applied to exchange relations in intermediate goods and resource 
markets as well. Marketing theory can also be about the marketing of non-profit or-
ganizations and social marketing, or the exchange within organizations.45 Wilkinson 
and Young see the existence of a substantial and evolving body of work on marketing 
theory and methodology that evolved during the last two millennia, but they admit 
that the big picture of marketing theory is often not apparent because of a narrow, 
technique-oriented, normative, micromarketing orientation in average marketing 
texts.46  
                                                 
39 Cf. Ryans Jr./Van’t Spijker/Bergin (1974), pp. 622f. 
40 Cf. Baumol (1957), p. 414; see section 3 (pp. 10-18) for further details. 
41 Cf. Easton (2002), p. 105; Hunt (1983), p. 9; Arndt (1983), p. 44. 
42 Bagozzi (1975), p. 32. 
43 Cf. Hunt (1983), p. 13. 
44 Cf. Hansen/Bode (2000), p. 319. 
45 Cf. Raffée (1995), col. 1669-1671. 
46 Cf. Wilkinson/Young (2002), p. 82. 
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2.2 Sources of Marketing Theory 
Dixon finds an ancient Greek claim for the invention of permanent marketplaces to 
facilitate exchange in the writings of the historian Herodotus from the 5th century BC. 
Exchange transactions always raised questions, e.g. about the sharing of benefits. 
Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle were dealing with such questions as early as the 
4th century BC.47 It is presumptuous to call these philosophers the first marketing 
theoreticians, but systematized ideas about marketing are older than one might think. 
In 1831 the British archbishop and scholar Whately already suggested that in eco-
nomic science attention should be focused on human exchange behaviour or ‘catallac-
tics’.48 The hour of the birth of modern marketing is nonetheless controversial. Some 
believe it was in 1960, when McCarthy named the 4 P’s for the first time, while espe-
cially in Germany the year 1955 is suggested, when Gutenberg published his ‘Instru-
ments of Sales-Policy’.49 German marketing research in the last three decades of the 
bygone century can be characterized by a large number of theoretical foundations and 
a variety of research directions.50 It goes without saying that this is true for interna-
tional marketing research as well. It is not surprising since the common perception of 
marketing is interdisciplinary, comprising knowledge from such diverse scientific 
fields as business administration, sociology and mathematics,51 as well as economics, 
psychology, statistics and operations research.52 Altogether, Meffert distinguishes 
eight important approaches to marketing research (decision orientation, system orien-
tation, behaviourism, the situational approach, New Institutional Economics (NIE), 
relationship marketing, the resource-based view, and process orientation),53 none of 
which has a monopoly on marketing theorizing. The three approaches that have 
reached the status of important paradigms for marketing as identified by Kaas will be 
briefly introduced. All three of them contain specific strengths and weaknesses: the 
neo-behaviouristic, the neo-institutional (based on NIE), and the neoclassical ap-
proach.54 The latter two have been drawn from microeconomic theory. They are simi-
                                                 
47 Cf. Dixon (2002), pp. 88f. 
48 Cf. Whately (1831), p. 253. 
49 Cf. Müller-Hagedorn (2000), p. 29; McCarthy (1960); Gutenberg (1955); [“Absatzpolitisches 
Instrumentarium“]. 
50 Cf. Kaas (2000), p. 72; Backhaus (2000), p. 5. 
51 Cf. Chmielewicz (1988), p. 450. 
52 Cf. Horsky/Sen (1980), p. S5. 
53 Cf. Meffert (1999). 
54 Cf. Kaas (2000), p. 72. 
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lar to Austrian economics in that they analyze the decisions of single companies, 
households or market participants.55 
Contemporary social sciences are still dominated by the microeconomic paradigm.56 
Its success in marketing began in the early twentieth century, after many marketing 
scholars turned to the neoclassical approach of economists such as Alfred Marshall.57 
Since “[…] marketers and economists are often interested in similar problems”, neo-
classicism became important for marketing.58 Popular themes in marketing often cor-
respond with a field of research in economics, e.g. advertising, pricing or distribu-
tion.59 Neoclassicism simplifies reality by assuming that individuals are perfectly 
informed and try to maximize given goals.60 These stringent assumptions allow the 
construction of abstract, mathematically testable models.61 The strength of neoclassi-
cism is the analysis and explanation of pricing decisions, the influence of prices on 
buying decisions and reactions towards changes in price,62 but the highly explanatory 
power of neoclassicism is only reached when the behaviour of the actors is compati-
ble with the assumptions; e.g. as an approximation of the (marketing-) behaviour of 
companies in industrial markets.63 Marketing is indebted to neoclassicism for impor-
tant insights, such as the price theory, market reaction functions, and game theory. 
One of the latest approaches that is important is the neo-institutional one. Marketing 
intensively picked up neo-institutional theories in the early 1990s,64 at first for mar-
keting in industrial markets, later for services and consumer goods markets as well.65 
“A central construct [of NIE] is market uncertainty and the way this is dealt with. […] 
Exogenous uncertainty is caused by factors not controlled by the relevant actors, 
while endogenous uncertainty [information asymmetries, expectation of opportunistic 
                                                 
55 Cf. Kaas (2000), p. 60. 
56 Cf. Arndt (1983), p. 46. 
57 Cf. Sheth/Gross (1988), p. 10. One of the first scholars in early marketing to adopt Marshall’s ideas 
was Frank W. Taussig, an economist at Harvard Business School who studied in 1879 and 1880 at the 
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Berlin, [today Humboldt University (HUB)]. He was also a friend of 
Ignaz Jastrow, the first rector of the Handelshochschule Berlin, nowadays the Faculty of Economics 
and Business Administration of the HUB. Cf. Jones/ Monieson (1990), pp. 106f. 
58 Horsky/Sen (1980), p. S5. 
59 Cf. Horsky/Sen (1980), p. S6. 
60 Cf. Arndt (1983), p. 46. 
61 Cf. Terberger (1994), pp. 84f. 
62 Cf. Kaas (2000), pp. 65f. 
63 Cf. Franke (2002), p. 191. 
64 Cf. Kaas (2000), pp. 62f. 
65 Cf. Meffert (1999), p. 51. 
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behaviour] is the result of strategic action of one or more of the exchange partners”.66 
NIE is based on four components: property rights theory, transaction cost economics, 
agency theory and information economics. Since these sub-theories focus on uncer-
tainty and the various types of institutions that arise to overcome uncertainty, market-
ing becomes the management of information and uncertainty in markets.67 An exam-
ple of marketing research based on NIE is the agency-theory explanation of salesforce 
compensation.68 
“Since the 1960s, it is rather the so called behavioural sciences which are the major 
source of marketing theory […]”.69 The basis of behavioural science is knowledge 
about motives, attitudes, and behavioural patterns of the consumer.70 Consumer re-
search in marketing draws heavily on theories and methods from psychology, sociol-
ogy, social psychology, and behavioural biology, mostly based on neo-behaviourism. 
Neo-behaviourism sees consumer behaviour towards a product or service offer as the 
reaction to a stimulus that is moderated through intervening variables and processes 
(like information processing and attitudes).71 A large number of theories has been 
deducted or adopted from the above-mentioned sciences, e.g. the attitudinal theory, 
the theory of reference prices or attribution theories.72 The strength of the neo-
behavioural approach towards marketing theory is its power to describe various social 
and psychological phenomena of consumer behaviour ignored by neoclassical theory, 
like the impact of advertising, product evaluation and the subjective perception of 
objective prices.73 In the Anglo-American sphere, consumer researchers drawing on 
neo-behaviourism are widely accepted and see themselves as the most important 
school in marketing.74 
The three paradigms just described were not originally created as marketing theories, 
but the adoption of relevant parts of ‘foreign’ theories to explain phenomena in mar-
keting is a common and important source of theoretical knowledge in marketing.75 
                                                 
66 Kleinaltenkamp/Jacob (2002), p. 151. 
67 Cf. Kleinaltenkamp/Jacob (2002), p. 150-152. 
68 Cf. Eisenhardt (1988); Ghosh/John (2000). 
69 Franke (2002), p. 191; [„Seit etwa den 60er Jahren sind die Hauptquelle für Theorien im Marketing 
jedoch eher die sogenannten Verhaltenswissenschaften […]“]. Italics in original. 
70 Cf. Meffert (1999), p. 47. 
71 Cf. Kroeber-Riel/Weinberg (1999), pp. 29-31. 
72 Cf. Franke (2002), p. 191. 
73 Cf. Kaas (2000), pp. 64-66. 
74 Cf. Gröppel-Klein/Weinberg (2000), p. 81. 
75 Cf. Franke (2002), p. 189. 
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The second source of theoretical knowledge in marketing research is the development 
of genuine hypotheses and theories via induction from observations of reality. An 
example is the ‘product diffusion model of the demand growth for new products’, 
also called the Bass Model.76 It states that the demand for innovative technologies, 
products, and services roughly follows a bell-shaped diffusion curve.77 Demand 
grows over time because the information about the improved qualities needs time to 
diffuse across the population of potential buyers,78 and declines again after the diffu-
sion of the information about improved technologies. 
2.3 Problems of Marketing Theory 
Marketing science seems to be torn between feelings of superiority and inferiority.79 
On the one hand the object of marketing science – marketing – claims to be the essen-
tial function of business, existing for the sake of companies, consumers, and the 
whole society,80 and introductions to marketing textbooks culminate in the notion of 
the ubiquity of marketing phenomena: “[…] marketing as universal truth and funda-
mental principle of human being”.81 Academic marketing thus theorizes conflicts 
between marketing and consumers away: the interests of companies and consumers 
are aligned if the marketing perspective serves as a guide for company policy. In spite 
of this, there is a growing fear that mass marketing results in least common denomi-
nator goods, producing a conformity of style, marginalizing risk taking, and closing 
down interpretation.82 The possibilities of shaping markets with regular marketing-
instruments are more and more questioned.83 In 1945 Converse started the discussion 
about the scientific status and theoretical background of marketing.84 This issue has 
not been finally resolved and still shatters the self-confidence of those working in the 
field of marketing.85 The question is if marketing is, instead of a science, “rather an 
art or a practice, and as such much more closely resembles engineering, medicine, 
                                                 
76 Cf. Franke (2002), p. 192. 
77 Cf. Bass (1995), pp. G8f. 
78 Cf. Bass (1993), p. 4. 
79 Cf. Bubik (1996), p. 17. 
80 Cf. Hansen/Bode (2000), p. 314; Keith (1960); Levitt (1960). 
81 Hansen/Bode (2000), p. 314; [„[…] Marketing als universelle Wahrheit und Fundamentalprinzip des 
menschlichen Seins“]. 
82 Cf. Holt (2002), pp. 70f. 
83 Cf. Meffert (1999), p. 42; Tucker (1974), p. 30. 
84 Cf. Converse (1945). 
85 Cf. Rese (2000), p. 214; Engelhardt (1998), p. 13. 
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and architecture than it does physics, chemistry, or biology”,86 “the viper at the 
bosom” of, and all in all a “tragedy” for, business administration.87 Harsh criticism 
against the adoption of particular theories has been launched, e.g. Schneider’s attack 
against the adoption of non-economic behaviourism in marketing, the application of 
which by marketers must inevitably be amateurish in his opinion,88 followed suit by 
counterattacks.89 Dichtl expressed his fear that marketing academicians “[…] pounce 
themselves enthusiastically on esoteric concepts of economic provenance with prom-
ising names (e.g. transaction cost theory, principal agent theory, and property rights 
theory) […]. […] The picture [of marketing theory] is marked by esotericism, epi-
gones, fashions and omissions”.90 One problem mentioned here, the willingness of 
following and creating fashions by paying much attention to particular topics which 
are later replaced by even newer fads, led to a highly fragmented science and in part 
extremely specialized scientists. Since theories with considerable depth but a lack of 
breadth are constructed especially in the United States, little overall scientific pro-
gress is measurable.91 The neoclassic theory in marketing is not left unchallenged 
either: due to its strict assumptions, especially concerning the unrealistic view of the 
homo oeconomicus, researchers reject it as the basis for a theory of marketing as ex-
change.92 
 
3 Epistemological Principles and Criteria for Marketing Theory 
The search for criteria separating science from non-science dates back to the begin-
nings of western philosophy.93 A foundation for the epistemological analysis of Aus-
trian economics on principles of the philosophy of science follows. 
                                                 
86 Hutchinson (1952), p. 289. 
87 Schneider (1983a), pp.198; 200. 
88 Cf. Schneider (1983a); Schneider (1983b). 
89 Cf. Raffée (1984); Dichtl (1983). 
90 Dichtl (1998), p. 47; [„[…] stürzt sich stattdessen begeistert auf esoterische Konzepte volkswirt-
schaftlicher Provenienz mit verheißungsvoll klingenden Namen (z.B. Transaktionskostentheorie, Prin-
cipal Agent Theory und Property Rights Theory) […]. […] Das Bild ist mithin geprägt von Esoterik, 
Epigonentum, Modeerscheinungen und Versäumnissen“]. 
91 Cf. Engelhardt (1998), p. 13; Dichtl (1998), p. 53; Tietz (1993), p. 158; Sheth/Gardner/Garrett 
(1988), p. 15. 
92 Cf. Arndt (1983), p. 46. 
93 Cf. Laudan (1980). 
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3.1 Elements of Theory Construction 
3.1.1 Use and Abuse of Assumptions 
Assumptions can objectively be correct or incorrect and tested for that property. But 
in contrast to hypotheses no claim about their truth can be made. Their purpose in 
science is to simplify a complex problem and the analysis of the problem. There are 
two caveats against the excessive use of assumptions: Firstly, the employment of as-
sumptions necessarily omits important parts of a problem. Secondly, a model which 
is based on strict assumptions might immunize itself against reality and empirical 
testing and thus become unfalsifiable (see section 3.2.2, pp. 14f.).94 
3.1.2 Definitions and Terms as a Basis for Good Hypotheses 
The expression for a certain phenomenon,  like ‘costs’, is called ‘term’. If there is 
uncertainty about a term, it needs to be defined,95 thus definitions become the bases 
for terms. A definition consists of two parts: a short ‘definiendum’ (to be defined) is 
connected to a longer ‘definiens’ (paraphrase of the definiendum).96 Definitions in 
themselves carry neither information nor truth and they are neither right nor wrong;97 
they are just agreements and conventions.98 The purpose of definitions is to shorten 
and clarify the language as groundwork for broadly understandable theories.99 Terms 
can be evaluated by their precision, consistency and validity. Ambiguously under-
stood terms are often a major setback for empirical studies, if the correct measure-
ment of designated events is especially important.100 
3.1.3 Hypotheses and Laws as the Core of Theorizing 
“Scientific hypotheses are suppositions about the structural nature of reality”.101 
While they subjectively claim to be true,102 scientific hypotheses always have a pre-
liminary character and can, in contrast to definitions, thus be proven wrong.103 The 
‘truth’ of statements has to be distinguished into logically (L-) determined and factu-
                                                 
94 Cf. Chmielewicz (1988), pp. 121f. 
95 Cf. Schanz (1988), p. 17. 
96 Cf. Chmielewicz (1988), p. 452; Popper (1992), p. 17. 
97 Cf. Chmielewicz (1994), p. 49; Balzer (1997), p. 66. 
98 Cf. Popper (1989), p. XIX. 
99 Cf. Balzer (1997), pp. 65f.; Popper (1992), pp. 22f., 26f. 
100 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 20-22. 
101 Schanz (1988), p. 24; [„Realwissenschaftliche Hypothesen sind Vermutungen über die strukturelle 
Beschaffenheit der Realität“]. Emphasis in original; cf. Schneider (2001), pp. 24f. 
102 Cf. Chmielewicz (1994), p. 119. 
103 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 25; 27. 
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ally (F-) determined statements. The former are proven by logic and mathematics. 
Important for this study are the F-determined statements. Their truth can only be ex-
amined in reality or with empirical means.104 Usually a hypothesis passes four stages: 
the first stage can be called speculation; the second is the empirically tested hypothe-
sis, which is only valid for the explanation of a single phenomenon; at the third stage 
hypotheses are grounded on a connection to existing knowledge that has not yet been 
tested. Hypotheses at the fourth stage are called reliable. They have proven to be 
worthwhile in multiple empirical tests. A reliable hypothesis that has a general scope 
as well is called a law or a statement of invariance.105 This assumes that nature, soci-
ety or man follow some constant pattern or regularity.106 Similar to terms, acceptable 
laws fulfil some criteria as well. A law should be applicable to more than one class of 
events (generality), it should be strictly tested (reliability) and belong to a system of 
laws.107 Such a system of laws then forms a theory.108 
3.1.4 Makeup of Theories and their Status in Science 
A few scientists regard the creation and definition of terms as the goal of science, 
whereas the majority of scientists refuse this essentialist view, being inclined to test 
hypotheses and create new theories.109. Even though “the term ‘theory’ is vague and 
ambivalent not only in the social realm, but also in the philosophy of science”,110 
there are descriptions of the nature of theories. Theories are systems of laws that con-
tain scientific information in an easily understandable manner. Regularly those hy-
potheses that reached the status of laws form the basis of such a system, and are 
called axioms there. Axioms in a theory must be consistent, i.e. they may not contra-
dict each other. Furthermore, the single axioms are preferably independent of each 
other.111 “Theories establish a general cause/effect-connection [and] […] describe 
                                                 
104 Cf. Chmielewicz (1988), p. 456. 
105 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 27f. 
106 Cf. Albert (1964), p. 40. 
107 Cf. Schanz (1988), p. 29. 
108 Cf. Bunge (1967a), p. 381. 
109 Cf. Chmielewicz (1988), p. 452; Müller-Hagedorn (2000), p. 28. Even though Mephistopheles told 
one of Faust’s students that “Grey, dear friend, is all theory, and green life’s golden tree” [“Grau, 
teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, und grün des Lebens goldner Baum”], “There is nothing more useful for 
practice than theory” [“Nichts nützt der Praxis mehr als die Theorie”]. Goethe (1961), verses 2038-
2039, p. 60; Albert (1971), p. 219. 
110 Chmielewicz (1994), p. 162; [“Der Theoriebegriff ist aber in der Wissenschaftstheorie ebenso wie 
im Sozialleben vage und mehrdeutig“]. Emphasis in original. 
111 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 24; 29-31; Popper (1989), p. 41. 
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empirical regularity or invariance in the nature or the social world […]”. 112 A typical 
statement from a theory would then be the following: Cause x1 implies the effects y1, 
y2 and y3. Once a theory has been established on grounds of acceptable laws, it should 
vice versa be possible to suggest and derive new laws and hypotheses from the the-
ory. Examples are Kepler’s and Galilei’s laws that can be derived from Newton’s 
theory of gravitation.113  
3.2 Criteria for a Qualitative Assessment of a Theory 
The distinction between good and useful theories as opposed to worthless assump-
tions or, more generally, between knowledge on the one hand and magic, superstition, 
speculation and dreaming on the other, is very important for the philosophy of sci-
ence.114 The following criteria have been developed to assess the potential of theories 
or their basic ingredients, i.e. hypotheses. The first two criteria (universality and pre-
cision) determine the empirical content of a hypothesis. The empirical content and its 
converse of logical scope in turn determine the falsifiability of a hypothesis. 
3.2.1 Universality, Precision, and Empirical Content 
Good hypotheses, laws, and theories should have a universal character respectively 
reliability across space and time, which means that their empirical (informational) 
content grows with increasing validity at different places and points in time. What is 
similarly important is the conditionality that is expressed in the ‘if-then-form’, e.g. 
condition p is the cause for consequence q or short: if p, then q. If either the if- or 
then-component is altered, the empirical content of the hypothesis and thus its ex-
planatory power is altered. The universality of a hypothesis depends on the if-
component. Increasing content of the if-component decreases the universality of the 
hypothesis, and vice versa.115 To put it in other words: the more conditions there are 
in the if-component, the less likely will the then-component be. On the contrary, the 
fewer conditions are connected to the if-component, the likelier is the occurrence of 
the then-component. The precision of a hypothesis is determined by an alteration of 
its then-component. A reduced (increased) content of the then-component implies 
                                                 
112 Chmielewicz (1994), p. 11; [„Theoretische Aussagen konstatieren einen generellen Ursa-
che/Wirkungs-Zusammenhang [und] […] eine empirische Regelmäßigkeit der Natur- oder Sozialwelt 
[…]“]. 
113 Cf. Chmielewicz (1994), p. 163. 
114 Cf. Feyerabend (1965), p. 331. 
115 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 32f. 
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lower (higher) precision of the whole expression.116 Put differently: the more possible 
outcomes the then-component allows, the lower is the hypothesis’ explanatory power. 
If the universality and precision of a hypothesis grow, its empirical content increases, 
but the more precise and universal a hypothesis claims to be, the bigger is the number 
of potentially contradicting events and the risk of falsification.117 “Theories are val-
ued largely for their explanatory power and simplicity […]”,118 so the scientist’s ob-
jective should always be to strive for more general and more precise hypotheses.119 
3.2.2 Empirical Content, Logical Scope, and Falsification 
The logical scope of a hypothesis describes the class of logical possibilities that is 
compatible with it. Logical scope and empirical content are converse to each other: 
the latter covering the class of logical possibilities that are incompatible with the hy-
pothesis.120 An example is in order. We assume that a company increases its promo-
tional activities, implying three possible outcomes: sales will increase, stay constant, 
or decrease. If we hypothesize that sales increase with increased promotional activity, 
the logical scope (=increasing sales) of the hypothesis is small while the empirical 
content (=constant or decreasing sales) is large. The notion of constant or decreased 
sales is incompatible with the hypothesis. Should this notion be made, the hypothesis 
would be proven wrong or falsified. If we restate our hypothesis to “Sales will in-
crease or stay constant with increased promotion”, the logical scope has grown com-
pared to the first case, whereas the empirical content is smaller. It has become more 
difficult to falsify the hypothesis, because now more outcomes are compatible with 
the hypothesis. In case of a statement claiming that sales will increase, stay constant 
or decrease with increased promotion the logical scope is at its maximum, because all 
conceivable outcomes are now compatible with the statement. Unfortunately, the em-
pirical content is zero and the statement cannot be falsified anymore. It follows that 
the more outcomes a statement excludes, the larger is its empirical or informational 
content and the more will it tell about reality. A theory with a larger class of incom-
patible outcomes is more bound to fail – it is easier falsified.121 Falsificationism in the 
modern philosophy of science stems from Popper’s “The Logic of Scientific Discov-
                                                 
116 Schanz (1988), pp. 33f. 
117 Cf. Chmielewicz (1994), p. 124. 
118 Bakker/Clark (1988), p. 4. 
119 Cf. Schanz (1988), p. 34. 
120 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 35f. 
121 Cf. Popper (1989), p. 77. 
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ery”.122 The so-called approach of “critical rationalism”123 rejects verification and the 
possibility that a hypothesis or theory can ever definitely be proven to be true, be-
cause a finite number of observations never allow conclusions to be drawn about an 
infinite number of possible outcomes.124 Many believe that critical rationalism is su-
perior to other epistemological approaches in marketing.125 In the social sciences, if 
rigorous testing via observations and experiments in reality provides evidence against 
a statement, the statement is falsified and should be rejected. Until then, the statement 
is tentatively entertained.126 To summarize, a good theory has much empirical con-
tent, thus offering many possibilities for falsification, but always withstands the at-
tempt to do so.127 
3.2.3 The ‘Triangular Problem’ of Novelty, Truth, and Empirical Content 
The basic necessity of a theory is truth, but truth is not sufficient.128 High empirical 
content is also important, but unfortunately a conflict of aims between truth and high 
empirical content of F-determined statements hinders theory development. This con-
flict induces that the better fulfilment of aim A1 (truth) results in a worsened position 
for aim A2 (empirical content).129 There are few theories in the social sciences that 
claim to be true always and everywhere.130 Sometimes depicting the world realisti-
cally is not even the goal of a theory, but presenting a simplified or distorted picture 
of the world.131 Since there is a trade-off between a high likelihood and high empiri-
cal content, scientists must emphasise one of the two. They usually prefer high em-
pirical content.132 A hypothesis with a high likelihood can be highly probable just 
because it does not tell much or nothing at all.133 
The former reflections can be extended by novelty to the ‘triangular problem’ (see 
fig. 1, p. 76). Novelty can either be expressed in a totally new idea, or in making new 
                                                 
122 Cf. Durbin (1988), p. 103; Popper (1980); the first edition was issued in German in 1934 (with date 
of 1935); for a short critique of Popper, cf. Chalmers (2001), pp. 73-86. 
123 Cf. Albert (1960). 
124 Cf. Suppe (1977), p. 167; Kloten/Kuhn (1965), p. 311. 
125 Cf. Raffée (1995), col. 1674; Easton (2002), p. 104. 
126 Cf. Chalmers (2001), p. 52. 
127 Cf. Chalmers (2001), p. 56. 
128 Cf. Chmielewicz (1988), p. 456. 
129 Cf. Chmielewicz (1994), p. 129. 
130 Cf. Bayer/Stölting (1994), p. 304. 
131 Cf. Eberhard (1999), p. 15. 
132 Cf. Popper (1989), p. 314. 
133 Cf. Popper (1989), p. 352. An example is the saying “If the cock screams the weather changes or 
stays like it is”, which is always correct but does not help at all.  
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connections of ideas already known, or creating a new form of representing an idea. 
The generalized conflict of aims exists between the search for truth, empirical content 
and novelty. Fulfilling two out of those three objectives can be simple. Novelty and 
truth are expressed in trivialities that have no empirical content; novelty and empirical 
content without truth are found in fantastic speculations; truth and empirical content 
without novelty are e.g. found as plagiarisms of existing theories. Besides of empiri-
cal content, novelty is the dominating objective for scientific statements,134 though 
major breakthroughs are only achieved if all three conditions are fulfilled. 
3.3 Fields of Application of a Theory 
Theories are created to solve problems of theoretical or practical relevance.135 The 
first category contains intellectually stimulating problems,136 and those with impor-
tant implications for theoretical systems.137 The second category subsumes problems 
that real persons regard as important for their actions.138 
3.3.1 Description and Explanation of Reality 
Describing real facts and events – though not offering much reputation – is a distinc-
tive and essential part of scientific work. In the field of marketing, there are many 
descriptions of particular cases, e.g. about tendencies of concentration in business 
sectors, distribution channels, market shares etc.139 Popper pointed out the essence of 
theorizing in a metaphor: “The theory is the net we cast out to catch ‘the world’ – for 
rationalisation, description and domination”,140 i.e. theories are created to simplify, 
describe, and understand our environment. 
Schanz claims that the ability to explain is the most important property of theories.141 
To be explained (the explanandum) with the help of theories are why-questions, the 
answers to which provide reasons that explain why things are in one way and not the 
                                                 
134 Cf. Chmielewicz (1994), pp. 131f. 
135 Cf. Franke (2002), pp. 13f. 
136 Cf. Zaltman/Lawther (1979), pp. 501f. 
137 Cf. Witte (1998), p. 740. 
138 Cf. Schanz (1992), p. 58. 
139 Cf. Müller-Hagedorn (2000), p. 29. 
140 Popper (1989), p. 31; [“Die Theorie ist das Netz, das wir auswerfen, um ‘die Welt’ einzufangen, - 
sie zu rationalisieren, zu erklären, und zu beherrschen“]. The original metaphor was written by No-
valis: “Hypotheses are nets, only he will catch, who casts out…” [“Hypothesen sind wie Netze, nur der 
wird fangen, der auswirft…”]; Novalis (1789). 
141 Cf. Schanz (1988), p. 56. 
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other.142 In marketing this could be employing the neoclassical notion that increased 
prices for normal goods ceteris paribus (c.p.) decrease the consumers’ propensity to 
buy,143 or the thesis from the behavioural sciences that satisfaction exercises an effect 
on customer loyalty.144 One law and at least one secondary condition or assumption is 
necessary to explain problems found in reality. If we want to explain why a customer 
is very loyal to a coffee-brand, we can find the law “Customers who experience satis-
faction with a good or service will be loyal”. In connection with the exemplary sec-
ondary condition “The customer loves the taste and smell of his coffee”, the problem 
is solved. If the law is assumed to be true, the secondary condition causes loyalty. 
This scheme of logical deduction of an explanandum from an explanans (law and 
secondary condition) is called “Hempel-Oppenheim-” or “Hempel-Popper-
Scheme”.145 Hempel and Oppenheim put up four constituting demands for the simple 
explanation (which is called deductive-nomological or DN-explanation): Firstly, the 
explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans. Secondly, the explan-
ans must contain at least one law. Thirdly, the explanans must have empirical content 
and, fourth, the explanans must be true.146 If one considers the rejection of verifica-
tion, the last demand diminishes to “the explanans may not have been falsified so 
far”. Another, not generally accepted demand is the possibility of independently test-
ing explanandum and explanans to avoid ad-hoc and circular explanations.147  
3.3.2 Prediction of Future Incidents and Technological Use 
Since “[p]redictions can be seen as the bridge between science and action”,148 suc-
cessful predictions often turn out to “[…] mark the turning point in acceptance of a 
theory that has been offered”. 149 Prognoses are those predictions that are based on 
theories.150 Schneider sees the origin of predictive theories in the missing link be-
tween empirical problems and best-practice examples. The explanatory theory sys-
                                                 
142 Cf. Bunge (1967b), pp. 3-9. 
143 Cf. Varian (1999), p. 98. 
144 Cf. e.g. Anderson/Sullivan (1993); for an overview, cf. Homburg/Giering/Hentschel (1999), pp. 93-
96. 
145 Cf. Hempel (1965), pp. 335-354; Popper (1989), pp. 31f. 
146 Cf. Hempel (1965), pp. 247f. 
147 Cf. Popper (1972), pp. 30f. 
148 Schanz (1988), p. 65; [“Voraussagen können gleichsam als Brücke zwischen Theorie und Handlung 
betrachtet werden”]. 
149 Bakker/Clark (1988), p. 21. 
150 Cf. Schanz (1988), p. 65. 
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tematizes existing knowledge and then offers solutions for the future.151 The initial 
situation for predictions is opposed to that of explanations (see fig. 2, p. 76). In the 
latter case, what was to be explained was given; fitting secondary conditions and one 
or more laws were to be found. Predictions work the other way round: the goal is to 
derive predictions from the given laws and secondary conditions. A predicted incident 
is contingent on two conditions: at first, the secondary conditions have to materialize 
and second, the relevant laws must be powerful. Laws with a high empirical content 
allow predictions because they rule out the possibility that certain events happen in 
the future.152 A non-technological prognosis does not offer exact suggestions for ac-
tion because the occurrence of the secondary conditions is not controllable. The prog-
nosis will be flawless only if those conditions can be actively controlled (technologi-
cal prognosis).153 
Technological prognoses are feasible only after transforming a theory into its techno-
logical form, which is a tautological transformation to clarify the relevance for practi-
cal problems.154 The transformed theory puts forward a ‘technique’ or ‘policy’.155 The 
cause/effect-framework is changed to a means/ends-framework.156 Kotler claims that 
“[m]arketing is a descriptive science involving the study of how transactions are cre-
ated, stimulated, facilitated and valued. Marketing management is a normative sci-
ence involving the efficient creation and offering of values to stimulate desired trans-
actions”.157 The task of marketing technology thus becomes assisting “[…] marketing 
decision makers by developing normative decision rules and models, […] based on 
the findings of marketing science”.158 
3.3.3 A Theory as a Device for Criticizing Social and Ideological Conditions 
Theories from the social sciences can be used to criticize social or ideological condi-
tions. As a theory allows conclusions to be drawn about the relations of causes and 
effects in reality, it informs us not only about a given state, but about possible situa-
tions as well. Questions about the consequences of different measures are answered 
with the help of theoretical knowledge. It becomes possible to criticize current social 
                                                 
151 Cf. Schneider (2001), p. 273. 
152 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 65-68. 
153 Cf. Albert (1964), p. 62. 
154 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 76-78. 
155 Cf. Albert (1984), p. 206. 
156 Cf. Chmielewicz (1994), pp. 11f. 
157 Kotler (1972), p. 52. 
158 Hunt (1983), p. 12. 
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realities using this information.159 Criticism of ideologies via theories is established 
on the claim that well-founded theories inform about prejudices. Ideologies which 
often claim to be based on scientific theories can only be successfully attacked with 
superior theories.160 
 
4 Fundamentals of Austrian Economics 
The Austrian school of economics, which originates from the publication of Carl 
Menger’s ‘Principles of Economics’ in 1871,161 is a serious adversary of the neoclas-
sical framework in the field of microeconomics.162 Both schools attempt to explain 
the functioning of markets, but while neoclassicism refers to the static model of equi-
librium analysis, Austrianism regards market coordination as a truly dynamic proc-
ess.163 
4.1 Assumptions of Austrian Economics 
The following five core assumptions of Austrian economics are the point of departure 
for the description and explanation of the market process: 
(1) Methodological individualism. 
(2) (Radical) Subjectivism. 
(3) Individuals differ and they have a will to change and create their future. 
(4) Space and time are influential. 
(5) (Radical) ignorance of market actors influences the market process.164 
(1) Methodological individualism: 
Methodological individualism refers to the practice of viewing social entireties such 
as national economies as the product of individual action. This assumption has been 
part of Austrian economics at all times.165 “Economics is not about things and tangi-
                                                 
159 Cf. Schanz (1988), pp. 82f. 
160 Cf. Albert (1964), p. 70. 
161 Cf. Smith (1986), p. vii. 
162 Cf. Kerber (1997), p. 33. For a neoclassical critique of Austrianism, cf. Caplan (1999); for an Aus-
trian critique of neoclassicism cf. Block/Barnett II/Wood (2002). 
163 Cf. Lingen (1993), pp. 70-72; 168; Hayek (1949), p. 94. 
164 Cf. Rese (2000), p. 66. 
165 Cf. Christainsen (1994), p. 11. 
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ble material objects; it is about men, their meanings and actions”,166 because 
“[u]ltimately, the entire social system, its prices, costs, supply, demand, the division 
of labour, money etc, must be traced to their roots in the actions, decisions and plans 
of individuals […]”.167 The individual as the key to all economic effects on markets 
must be regarded as the superstructure of Austrianism which predetermines all scien-
tific research.168 
(2) (Radical) Subjectivism: 
Subjectivism and its variation of radical subjectivism is firstly an approach to the 
study of human interaction with things or other humans and secondly the major tenet 
that distinguishes Austrians from neoclassicism. Economists who try to explain hu-
man interaction must start with the subjective meaning the individuals attach to their 
actions and their subjective mental states:169 “So far as human actions are concerned 
the things are what the acting people think they are […] [and] unless we can under-
stand what the acting people mean by their actions, any attempt to explain them […] 
is bound to fail”.170 The perceived marginal utility, a strictly subjective judgment, 
determines the value of a good for a consumer, and hence its price.171 These subjec-
tive value judgments for identical goods determine the attractiveness of exchanges. 
The discrepancy explains the positive net value of exchange.172 Subjective value 
judgments depend on subjective knowledge.173 The so-called ‘radical subjectivists’, 
most notably Lachmann and Shackle, assume that human actors decide on expecta-
tions of the future which they have at the moment of decision.174 Individual expecta-
tions differ because the future is unknown and unforeseeable.175 New knowledge that 
comes in the course of time is responsible for the incompatibility of the actors’ plans 
with those of others at any point in time.176 Equilibrating forces are always overtaken 
by unexpected and disequilibrating change before a long-run general equilibrium is 
                                                 
166 Mises (1949), p. 92. 
167 Kirkpatrick (1983), p. 46. 
168 Cf. Rese (2000), p. 67. 
169 Cf. Horwitz (1994), p. 17. 
170 Hayek (1952), pp. 44; 53. 
171 Cf. Kirkpatrick (1983), pp. 46f. 
172 Cf. Rese (2000), p. 67. 
173 Cf. Horwitz (1994), p. 18. 
174 Cf. Kirzner (2000), p. 46. 
175 Cf. Lewin (2000), p. 387. 
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reached. Markets for particular goods may temporarily find equilibrium, but the 
whole economy never does.177 
(3) Individuals and their will to change and create: 
The differences of individuals manifest themselves in divergent endowments and di-
vergent experiences, resulting in dissimilar knowledge, values and heterogeneous 
expectations.178 Constrained by incomplete wisdom, human beings are creative and 
act toward change. They have the capacity of acting with self-interest and purpose to 
pursue the satisfaction of their hierarchy of needs. This innate quality in humans is 
identified as homo agens, the acting man who makes conscious, reasoned deci-
sions.179 Mises identifies three reasons for human action: first, “[a]cting man is eager 
to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory”. Second, he 
“[…] imagines conditions that suit him better, and his action aims at bringing about 
this desired state”. Third, the actor has “[…] the expectation that purposeful behav-
iour has the power to remove or at least alleviate the felt uneasiness”.180 His will to 
move into a (subjectively perceived) preferable state of affairs in connection to differ-
ent endowments fuels the market process.181 Since each individual is unique, every-
one can perceive different ends. Some strive for sexual satisfaction, food, material 
things, but they may as well care for altruistic or the so-called higher goals.182 For 
Austrians, economic theory is ‘praxeology’, the science of human action.183 The axi-
oms of praxeology are supposed to be true and meaningful, because they are the es-
sence of human being. A verbal deduction of the implications of praxeology is true 
and meaningful as well, mathematical symbolization superfluous.184 
(4) The influence of space and time: 
The influence of space and time is very important in Austrian theorizing. If time is 
perceived as a flow of events, it brings novelty and surprises. Living and acting today 
is connected to tomorrow’s actions, since individual experience of today’s events 
alters tomorrow’s perception of events.185 The elapse of time permits the gaining of 
                                                 
177 Cf. Lachmann (1976), pp. 60f. 
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new experiences, which acknowledges the creation and alteration of knowledge.186 
Newly discovered knowledge often makes clear to the economic actors that their ex-
pectations of the future were wrong and in need of revision.187 In the course of these 
revisions and through actor’s learning of truly novel things, the market process be-
comes an engine of discovery.188 In this sense, the Austrian theory of entrepreneur-
ship critically depends on a dynamic perception of time.189 
(5) Radical ignorance and its influence on the market process: 
Kirzner distinguishes two kinds of ignorance: rational ignorance and radical (sheer, 
utter) ignorance. In the former case, actors maximize profit or utility with foreseeable 
knowledge. The actors are aware of their amount of knowledge and they are aware of 
the fact that if they accept certain expenses of money or time, they can gain additional 
knowledge in a planned search. The search for additional information is conducted 
until the marginal return of information equals the marginal cost for the search, so 
that an optimum is attained. Rational ignorance conforms to neoclassical theory.190 
The latter case is in line with the Austrian framework, where the existence of radical 
ignorance is assumed. Being radically ignorant instead of ignorant by choice does not 
only mean that there is not any prior knowledge concerning the costs and benefits of 
becoming aware of some novel facts,191 but it refers to the total (radical, sheer) un-
awareness of the existence of knowledge that is not known so far. New facts may be 
accidentally learned by chance or inevitably during participation in the market proc-
ess.192 If actors possessed knowledge of things unknown so far, it would certainly 
affect their plans.193 Thus, ignorance allows for opportunities in the market process, 
which alert entrepreneurs may recognize and exploit (see section 4.2.1, pp. 22-24).194 
4.2 The Working of the Market Process 
Austrian economic theory explains how information influences the decisions of mar-
ket actors and how the market succeeds in distributing relevant information to those 
who will make the best use of it. The problem of information has already been solved 
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in neoclassic theory due to the assumption of individual with perfect knowledge.195 In 
the following part it will be explained and described how the market process solves 
the informational problem in Austrian economics. 
4.2.1 The Market Process under the Influence of Ignorance 
The interaction of market participants or market actors – consumers, entrepreneur-
producers and resource owners – takes place in a market,196 so it can be said that the 
market is the result of interacting decisions of market actors during a given period of 
time.197 Yet, a market must not be regarded as a static place for interaction. The mar-
ket is only delimited from an individual perspective. Each actor perceives the bounda-
ries of the market differently, depending on his radical ignorance. In an extreme case, 
a market may only consist of two actors: one buyer and one seller. This extreme Aus-
trian micro-perspective is incompatible with the idea of a single market where all 
suppliers of one good compete against each other.198 The people who interact in the 
market try to fulfil plans by buying and selling.199 They hope to enhance their situa-
tion and to reach advantages through exchange.200 The homo agens in Austrian eco-
nomics is, in contrast to the homo oeconomicus of neoclassical economics, not lim-
ited to given means and ends. He has the will and alertness to subjectively formulate 
ends worth striving for and finding the means necessary to reach his ends. His deci-
sions are economizing on the basis of his chosen ends and known means, i.e. the actor 
tries to most efficiently maximize ends with available means. With respect to his 
knowledge it can be said that he acts subjectively rational.201 Each actor has a differ-
ent endowment of abilities and objectives (wants and needs), and possesses incom-
plete and diverging knowledge about current demand and supply, prices and qualities. 
Market participants formulate their expectations and make plans on this basis.202 
Successful actors and their counterpart in the market offer each other the best 
opportunity each one knows of.203 Being successful may turn out to be difficult, 
because “[…] knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never 
exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incom-
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trated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess”.204 “As action 
necessarily is directed toward influencing a future state of affairs, […] it is affected 
by every incorrectly anticipated change in the data […], [and] […] the outcome of 
action is always uncertain. Action is always speculation”,205 which implies that some 
plans that have been formulated are disadvantageous – they will either fail or not fully 
exploit market opportunities. When plans cannot be executed, the actors may realize 
that they have been overly optimistic concerning the decisions of other market actors; 
or they realize that they have missed potential profit because they were too pessimis-
tic about market conditions.206 In any case, new information flows back to the market 
participants as a result of market interaction. Actors in the market learn from experi-
ence and systematically modify and revise their plans, which led to suboptimal deci-
sions, for the next period of interaction.207 Since single market transactions are not 
independent, but influence each other in many ways, all market actors are engaged in 
the revision of plans. Since one period is not enough to disclose all market knowledge 
to the actors, there is again a significant probability that both correct and incorrect 
decisions will be made in the following period of market interactions.208 The actor’s 
ability to learn from prior misjudgements and to test newly revised plans in the mar-
ket sets the market process in motion.209 The market thus becomes a means of discov-
ering and disseminating “[…] knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and 
place”.210 In this system knowledge about preferences and technologies is dispersed 
among many people. Prices for the diverse goods and services send a signal that ful-
fils the function of coordinating the actions of the separated individuals.211 Prices 
offer unambiguous incentives that tell the market actors which products are valued 
most highly. Market actors recognize what to do and produce,212 since they try to gain 
profits and avoid losses.213 If the actors’ current decisions incorrectly anticipate the 
decisions made by others, a state of disequilibrium prevails.214 In this case, prices 
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reflect defective information.215 The market process of mutual anticipation of plans 
continues until correct foresight drives all ignorance out of the market.216 Without 
exogenous change in preferences, technological possibilities or resource availability, 
all decisions made by buyers, sellers and producers will inevitably be aligned, all 
plans will be correctly executed and the market will reach a state of equilibrium.217 
4.2.2 Entrepreneurship in the Market Process 
The concept of the entrepreneur is central for the market process,218 but the societal 
role that entrepreneurs fulfil is feasible only in the presence of ignorance.219 To clar-
ify this, we will imagine a market where nobody is able to learn from experience, so 
that all actors infinitely repeat the same decisions. There are six possible outcomes of 
market interaction (see fig. 3, p. 76):220 
(1) Would-be-buyers return home empty-handed, because they offered to pay an 
insufficient price. They did not learn to outbid competitive buyers. 
(2) Buyers were able to buy and they paid an appropriate price. 
(3) Buyers could buy but they paid too much. They did not realize that they could 
get the same goods at a lower price. 
(4) Sellers did not sell everything or no goods at all. They asked too high prices 
and did not learn to underbid competitive sellers. 
(5) Sellers could sell and received an appropriate amount of money. 
(6) Sellers could sell but received not enough. They did not realize that they 
could sell their goods for a higher price. 
We introduce a group of outsiders into this world – entrepreneurs – who are able to 
learn from experience and to recognize opportunities for entrepreneurial profits. They 
are not necessarily interested in buying for themselves,221 but they are alert to where a 
good can be sold at a higher price than the purchase price. In our market of ignorant 
actors these entrepreneurs would instantaneously perceive profit opportunities that 
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arise from engaging in arbitrage in cases three and six: first, the entrepreneurs would 
buy resources from sellers who did not realize that they could charge more (case six). 
Next, the entrepreneurs would sell the goods to those buyers who did not realize that 
they could buy identical goods for less money (case three).222 Successful entrepre-
neurship can attract imitators and competitors who try to outdo the original entrepre-
neur with better deals.223 “The competition between the various entrepreneurs will 
move them to offer to buy from the low-price sellers, at prices higher than these sell-
ers had thought possible; entrepreneurs in competition will also sell to high-price 
buyers at prices lower than these buyers had thought possible”.224 Competition will 
move prices to a correct estimate of the participants’ eagerness to buy.225 In his at-
tempt “[…] to offer opportunities which market participants will consider more at-
tractive than those available elsewhere […]”, the entrepreneur relieves “[…] the con-
sumer of the necessity to be his own entrepreneur”.226 Profitable opportunities for 
arbitrage lure entrepreneurs to their discovery. The opportunity is exploitable until 
entrepreneurs in the competitive market process have reallocated all resources to a 
new equilibrium, where both opportunity and the misallocation of resources are 
eliminated.227 Sometimes discoveries are disequilibrating and even increasing igno-
rance,228 but in general the market process does not only lead to an adjustment of in-
dividual plans, but also to a state in which everything that is produced will be pro-
duced by those who can make it cheaper than (or equally cheap as) the next-best 
competing entrepreneur. Everything will be sold at a cheaper (or the same) price than 
the next-best competing entrepreneur asks.229 
The entrepreneurs are the “driving force of the whole market system”,230 and the en-
trepreneurs in competition systematically force the economy towards equilibrium; 
their alert exploitation of opportunities brings the economy in line with the informa-
tion available.231 Kirzner’s entrepreneur conforms to Mises’ and Hayek’s notion that 
“[…] a tendency towards equilibrium exists” since “[…] under certain conditions […] 
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the expectations of the people and particularly of the entrepreneurs will become more 
and more correct”.232 However, an equilibrium need not necessarily be reached be-
cause equilibrating processes are continually interrupted by changes in the underlying 
variables (preferences, resource availabilities, technological possibilities), which ini-
tiate new equilibrating processes.233  
It is the entrepreneur’s alert mind that observes and exploits profitable differences in 
the pattern of relative prices.234 The pure entrepreneur acts as an arbitrageur of oppor-
tunities. He does not need any initial endowment with resources. Entrepreneurship is 
therefore a costless activity. The sole prerequisite to compete is free market entry, 
which is always given in the absence of a monopoly over an essential input. Conse-
quently, everybody can be an entrepreneur.235 The focus of entrepreneurship is not on 
a particular group of men, but on a function.236 The distinctive characteristics of en-
trepreneurs as opposed to non-entrepreneurs are aggressiveness, boldness, creative-
ness, and leadership qualities which are all manifested in alertness.237 Alertness is a 
refined, abstract form of the knowledge of how to collect and employ information and 
resources.238 Alertness on its own is not sufficient for progress in the market process; 
it just offers chances that may be seized.239 It is difficult to deliberately search for 
pure profit opportunities because radical ignorance is an obstacle to the discovery of 
such opportunities.240 The Kirznerian entrepreneur is responsive to opportunities al-
ready existent and waiting to be noticed.241 In the multi-period case of the market 
process entrepreneurs are creatively and imaginatively shaping the future through 
responsiveness to intertemporal opportunities.242 
Entrepreneurs may engage in the so-called pure arbitrage by selling items for more 
than they paid. Entrepreneurship is also consistent with intertemporal arbitrage, if 
items are bought at a lower price in one period than they are sold for in a subsequent 
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period.243 The third option is that entrepreneurs recognize errors of coordination be-
tween the sum of prices for a bundle of resources needed to produce a product and the 
price of the output on the product market. Although they engage in the transformation 
of resources into a higher-state product, they still do not need to contribute resources 
of their own.244 The entrepreneur does not even need capital funds in case of time-
consuming production, if the opportunity is sufficient to enable him to offer an attrac-
tive interest payment.245 
4.2.3 Price Rivalry, Non-Price Rivalry, and Monopolistic Competition 
The market process advances only if alertness is paired with successful entrepreneur-
ship, which fulfils three notable criteria. First, the subjective perception of an oppor-
tunity must be congruent with the objective data. Second, the entrepreneur’s offer 
must be the most advantageous in comparison to others. Third, the entrepreneur must 
make the relevant market aware of his advantageous offer.246 While the first criterion 
is self-evident, the others deserve explanation.  
Acting men are in the favourable state of choosing between various opportunities,247 
from which they will choose the most attractive. An opportunity is more attractive if a 
lower (higher) price is required (offered) for the same product, from which follows 
that entrepreneurial competition takes the form of competition for the best price. An 
opportunity is also better compared to another one, if it offers buyers a more desirable 
product for a given price respectively if it asks of sellers something they relinquish 
less reluctantly. That is why competition takes place in the kinds and qualities of 
goods and services as well,248 which means that product differentiation is essential for 
entrepreneurial success in the face of competition.249 Consumers’ wishes and desires 
are not obvious facts, but problems to be solved in the market process.250 Mises 
stresses the primacy and sovereignty of the consumers over entrepreneurial action in 
regard to this. At first glance entrepreneurs are responsible for production and they 
are steering the economy, but in fact they are obeying the consumer’s orders. If entre-
preneurs do not pay attention to the continually changing tastes and desires for goods 
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and services, they will be driven out of the market.251 Strictly speaking, consumers 
are not longing “[…] for tangible goods as such, but for the services which these 
goods are fitted to render them”.252  
The third criterion is necessary because “[t]he consumer is not omniscient. He does 
not know where he can obtain at the cheapest price what he is looking for. Very often 
he does not even know what kind of commodity or service is suitable to remove most 
efficaciously the particular uneasiness he wants to remove. […]. To convey to him 
information about the actual state of the market is the task of business propa-
ganda”.253 The entrepreneur must not only make information available to consumers, 
his success crucially depends on the consumers’ awareness of a purchase opportunity. 
In wealthy societies with a broad range of products, more and more provocative ad-
vertising is necessary to alert market participants to the diversity of offers.254 In the 
1940s Mises recognized that “[b]usiness propaganda must be obstrusive and blatant. 
[…] Advertising is shrill, noisy, coarse, puffing, because the public does not react to 
dignified allusions. It is the bad taste of the public that forces the advertisers to dis-
play bad taste […]”.255 To conclude, entrepreneurial alertness includes anticipating 
the needs and wants of consumers, designing and developing products to satisfy those 
needs at competitive prices, and making the opportunity available at such a location 
and especially through information that the consumer cannot miss it.256 
The alert entrepreneur who is the only producer capable of offering a differentiated 
good or service at a given point in time is in the favourable position of having a 
temporary monopoly from a short-run perspective. He can reap above-average 
returns, but a position without unique resource ownership is vulnerable to imitation in 
a competitive environment and subsequent erosion of high margins in the longer 
run.257 The only possibility to eliminate competition and to reach a protected monop-
oly in the absence of legislative barriers is the exclusive control of an essential 
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absence of legislative barriers is the exclusive control of an essential resource.258 A 
long-run monopolistic position may be held due to initial resource endowments, e.g. 
if someone owns a unique natural skill. Alternatively, such a position may be won by 
alert entrepreneurial (and hence competitive) action.259 This happens if a market par-
ticipant recognizes “the possibility of making large profits by buying up all the avail-
able supply of a given resource, and then establishing himself as the monopolist pro-
ducer of a particular commodity”.260 Such an action is competitive in the long-run 
perspective because the entrepreneur made himself a monopolist resource owner in 
the course of his activities, a possibility that was ex ante open to all competing entre-
preneurs.261 Austrian economics implies the rejection of governmental interference 
into the market process despite the occurrence of monopolies,262 because coordination 
in the decentralised market process is always superior to centrally planned coordina-
tion.263 This position should not be mistaken with laisser-faire, since Austrian econo-
mists clearly appreciate the necessity of institutions for the functioning of the mar-
ket.264 
4.3 Hypotheses of Austrian Economics 
Austrian economics is focused on the equilibrating process that can be observed in 
markets, with emphasis being put on the role that information and entrepreneurship 
fulfil in the process. Despite of its long history, no formalised theory is to be found in 
the works of its representatives Mises, Hayek, or Kirzner, to name just a few. A com-
plete epistemological analysis of Austrian economics is impossible without a set of 
hypotheses. Fortunately, the large amount of work on Austrian economics in verbal 
form and the fundamentals of Austrian economics put forward in this thesis allow the 
deduction of a number of possible hypotheses. The following hypotheses are a step-
by-step reflection of the market process. 
Prices can be very quickly adapted in regard to supply and demand, e.g. if the demand 
for a particular good is very high and keeps on rising while the produced amount re-
mains fixed, prices can rise and still all goods produced will be sold. Prices are a 
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piece of information that lures entrepreneurs either to produce more of a certain 
commodity or to slow down or stop production.265 Hypothesis H1 follows: 
H1: If prices in a market are a measure of relative shortages, then they serve as a 
means of communicating information. 
Hypothesis H2 is not only a tautological transformation of the definition of the state 
of equilibrium (the market will be in equilibrium given perfect information), but here 
it is seen as an empirical observation from reality, that is hypothesized about. The 
incompleteness of information results in incorrect plans that lead to poorly adjusted 
plans and thus a state of disequilibrium:266 
H2: If information about supply and demand in a market is incomplete (if ignorance 
prevails), then the market will be in disequilibrium. 
A market that is in disequilibrium is made up of various suboptimal exchange rela-
tions. Entrepreneurs, who are alert to the existing arbitrage-opportunities in such a 
market, can earn risk-less profits.267 Hypotheses H3 and H4 express this: 
H3: If the market for a good or service is in disequilibrium, then opportunities for 
arbitrage exist. 
H4: If opportunities for arbitrage exist, then alert entrepreneurs will appear to exploit 
these opportunities. 
Entrepreneurial activities cause the generation of new knowledge, e.g. through an 
alteration of prices. Alert entrepreneurs perceive and interpret these new signals. 
Since making profits is the decisive entrepreneurial motive, some will try to gain a 
share of such opportunities by imitating and improving the original entrepreneur’s 
offer,268 which is expressed in Hypothesis H5: 
H5: If alert entrepreneurs exploit opportunities, then information about their activities 
spreads in the market in the course of time and imitators will be attracted. 
The homo agens has the ability to learn and alter his plans. A reduction of his igno-
rance due to additional information will thus improve his decision-making capabili-
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ties.269 The buyer’s enhanced plans will reward good offers in the market and punish 
bad offers through the allocation of resources.270 Furthermore, buyers profit from 
entrepreneurial sellers and their competitors in the market who drive down prices to 
an equilibrium level.271 Buyer and seller thus start a tendency towards equilibrium. 
Hypotheses H6 and H7 follow: 
H6: If information spreads and imitators appear, then experience and learning result in 
enhanced decision-making and plans that mutually fit better. 
H7: If better mutual plans are made, then an equilibrating tendency commences. 
 
5 A Review of Austrian Economics as a Marketing Theory 
5.1 A Qualitative Assessment of Austrian Economics 
The following section will critically evaluate the assumptions of Austrian economics 
in regard to its applicability for marketing theory and it will apply the criteria from 
the philosophy of science found in chapter three to the hypotheses of section 4.3 (p. 
31) to assess the epistemological qualities of Austrian economics. 
5.1.1 An Assessment of the Assumptions of Austrian Economics 
(1) Methodologicl individualism: 
On the one hand, the assumption that all social phenomena must be traced to individ-
ual decisions is certainly true. It is the people in a company and not the company as 
such who make decisions. The assumption of methodological individualism is con-
gruent with marketing as far as the buyers of goods or services are individuals or at 
least a rather small group of interacting individuals. On the other hand, the idea of 
methodological individualism of always examining the roots of everything, like com-
panies or nations, makes the analysis of their behaviour very complex and difficult. 
Only a minority point of view in Austrian economics claims that individual actions 
can be meaningfully aggregated. It is impossible to explain the continuous employ-
ment of empirical research and statistics in marketing with the view of the majority of 
scholars in Austrian economics. For them, market research is just speculation. The 
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success of companies or research departments specialised in market research tells a 
different story. Historical data is obviously valuable in predicting and planning future 
marketing strategies. 
(2) (Radical) Subjectivism: 
The assumption of subjectivism is the major difference between Austrian economics 
and neoclassicism and it is a necessary prerequisite for the existence and purposeful-
ness of marketing. Marketing would indeed lose its justification if it could not exploit 
human subjectivity. The perceived value of goods can be influenced by marketing via 
its set of tools and instruments. This change would be unthinkable given the neoclas-
sic assumption of perfect knowledge, but is possible given the more realistic assump-
tions about human decision making in Austrian economics. If all goods in a market-
place had an objective value, all exchanges would either stop or at least create no ex-
tra-value for anybody, because an equal amount of goods or money would be traded 
in exchange for the good. The assumption of subjectivism in Austrian economics 
gives the theory a foundation that is similar to the properties of real human beings. 
There have been long arguments about the choice between subjectivism and radical 
subjectivism. Empirically, there is a tendency toward equilibrium in markets.272 This 
evidence supports the Kirznerian point of view, although these tendencies might just 
be confined to submarkets. Since marketing is not interested in gaining implications 
for the whole economic system but rather for submarkets, the Kirzner’s school of 
simple subjectivism can be supported while there is no need to explicitly refuse the 
Lachmann/Shackle school of radical subjectivism  
(3) Individuals and their will to change and create: 
The homo agens of Austrian economics is based on common assumptions found in 
human condition and is thus expected to be universally true. It is hard to deny the 
Austrian a priori claim that human action, individual differences, and the will to 
change and create are given in all market actors. People had different endowments 
with knowledge, resources and capabilities in the past, they presently have different 
endowments and these conditions will prevail in the future without exogenous 
change. The will to change and create is expressed in every man’s actions, starting 
with instinctive acts like breathing or more complex acts like thinking and man’s de-
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sire to improve his situation. Even though the properties of the hypothesized homo 
agens are more realistical than those of the neoclassical homo oeconomicus, he is still 
only a condensed version of man. In Austrian economics, the ultimate reason for all 
action is man’s desire to enhance his situation. Man is able to choose his set of ends 
and apply known and appropriate means to it, but since Mises intentionally delimits 
praxeology from psychology,273 Austrian economics does not say anything about the 
internal processes of forming desires. While this view of man is suitable for the eco-
nomic analysis of the interplay of market actors and exchange on an abstract level, in-
depth attitudinal and motivational studies of human behaviour remain an important 
tool in marketing. Thus psychological theories that study the forming of ends are nec-
essary supplements to Austrian economics in marketing theory. They start describing, 
explaining, and predicting human behaviour where Austrian economics stops. 
(4) The influence of space and time: 
Like all theories, Austrian economics strives for a high reliability across space and 
time. The influence of space and time is also one of the core assumptions of Austrian 
economics and occupies a prominent place in the theory. The market process neces-
sarily takes place in a multi-period framework. During the course of time experience, 
learning, and the alteration of plans occur. In regard to this, reliability across space 
and time has to be a constituting quality of Austrian economics and is claimed to be 
valid in Austrian economics because of the fundamental, everlastingly true assump-
tions about humans and their actions.274 If the theory was reliable only at a given 
point in time, the market process could not unfold its coordinating powers. The whole 
theory about the process of market coordination through information would contradict 
itself and become meaningless. Reliability across space is very important, too. A gen-
eral marketing theory needs ubiquitous value for marketing phenomena. The exis-
tence of marketplaces in ancient Greece that made intensive exchange possible shows 
that market processes not only take place around the world today but took place in 
bygone millennia in many places, too. Equilibrating tendencies in market processes 
are applicable for barter economies, as well. We can assume that market processes 
happen always and everywhere, where people engage in exchange in competitive 
markets, i.e. given more than one buyer and seller and free market entry. Yet, the lat-
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ter condition puts constraints on its applicability. State legislation often restricts mar-
ket entry to various degrees, be it through patents and trademarks or be it through 
taxes or tariffs for foreign products. Austrian economics probably works better for 
markets in developed nations, because the flow of information should be better. We 
can imagine that the market process will be slower in developing nations with slower 
spread of information. 
(5) Radical ignorance and its influence on the market process: 
There are some famous examples of the existence and resolution of radical ignorance. 
The saga goes that Archimedes surprisingly found a way to unmask a deceitful jewel-
ler, who was suspected to have mixed cheap silver with expensive gold in King 
Hieron’s crown in ancient Sicily. While Archimedes slipped into a bathtub, the so-
called ‘Archimedes’ principle’ struck him. It states that different materials have a 
different density, and thus different displacement of water. Similarly dependent on 
surprise were Isaac Newton’s initial thoughts about the force of gravity. While resting 
under an apple tree, he recognized an apple falling down to earth. This set off his 
quest to solve why items on earth fall downwards and why the moon does not do 
so.275 While Archimedes already thought about his problem, the answer came not by 
logical deduction or a planned process of research, but by chance to his alert mind. 
Newton’s case goes even further: until he was almost hit by an apple, nobody had 
thought about gravitation for millennia. There is obviously radical ignorance about an 
infinite number of things in our universe. But going beyond the idea of passive alert-
ness, influencing the search for knowledge seems possible. There are conditions that 
foster the generation of knowledge, like money or networks of creative people. While 
the outcome of research is subject to radical ignorance, the knowledge about the po-
tential to create new knowledge is not. The task of marketing is to resolute ignorance, 
be it radical or not. Again, the existence of ignorance is a necessary condition for 
marketing to be purposeful. Without perfect information, marketing has the opportu-
nity to influence potential buyers to decide for possibility A instead of B. 
We can regard the assumptions of Austrian economics as quite realistically and thus 
useful for a field like marketing that tries to find ways to influence the decisions of 
real people. Two caveats are in order: firstly, the assumption of methodological indi-
vidualism is responsible for high complexity of the analysis of social wholes. Sec-
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ondly, the assumptions about subjectivity and the actors’ will to change and create 
can immunize Austrian theory against empirical testing. The latter point will be 
treated in more detail below (see section 5.1.2 below). 
5.1.2 An Assessment of the Hypotheses of Austrian Economics 
This section deals with an assessment of the hypotheses that can be derived from 
Austrian economics, as introduced in section 4.3 (pp. 30f.). The first concern is the 
universality and conditionality of Austrian economics. We initially regard H4 as an 
example. The hypothesis is perfectly compatible with Austrian economics. It was 
shown before that alert entrepreneurs perceive signals of disequilibrium, especially 
price-signals. The ‘if-component’ of H4 could be altered to H4.1: “If opportunities for 
intertemporal arbitrage exist, then alert entrepreneurs will appear to exploit this op-
portunity”, which is also perfectly compatible with Austrian economics, but less uni-
versal. Even less universal would be hypothesis H4.11: “If opportunities for intertem-
poral arbitrage in the market for pig-bellies exist, then alert entrepreneurs will appear 
to exploit this opportunity”. The larger the content of the ‘if-component’, the smaller 
will be the hypotheses’ universality. It is impossible to measure universality on a car-
dinal scale, but it is feasible to subsume various phenomena that can be recognized in 
markets under the hypotheses of Austrian economics. The concepts ‘incomplete in-
formation’, ‘markets’, ‘opportunities’ or ‘alert entrepreneurs’ etc may be further 
specified and filled with content by the researcher. Thus, the lack of a formalised 
theoretical body is strength and weakness at the same time. On the one hand, it offers 
the chance to generate a broad range of hypotheses about various aspects of markets, 
including marketing. On the other hand such a lack of formalisation contains the dan-
ger of arbitrariness. The pretext of Austrian economics is quite unspecific, so a guid-
ing hand in the generation of hypothesis would be helpful to keep in mind the core of 
Austrianism. There is also a lack of mathematical formulae to express the Austrian 
model. On the one hand Austrian economics seems straightforward and simple in 
relation to neoclassicism, because no complicated formal language is needed to ex-
plain the mechanics and implications of the theory. Some Austrians even regard 
mathematical models as exercises in pure logic that offer no new insights because of 
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their self-evident propositions.276 On the other hand such a formalisation could clarify 
statements that otherwise need exhaustive explanation. 
The broad and universal character of the ‘if-component’ in the basic hypotheses im-
plies a high likelihood of the ‘then-component’. The more conditions are connected to 
the ‘if-component’ (H4.1, H4.11), the more unlikely will the actual occurrence of the 
‘then-component’ become. Now we see if the precision of the given hypotheses could 
be enhanced, e.g. to H4.12: “If opportunities for arbitrage exist, then alert entrepre-
neurs will appear within a week on all relevant markets to exploit this opportunity.” 
Due to the assumptions of Austrian economics, such a limitation is impossible. It is 
e.g. the existence of radical ignorance that forbids objective knowledge about time 
and place of the occurrence of an opportunity. A market actor is either alert to the 
existing profit opportunity and exploits it instantaneously, or he is not alert enough 
and does not recognize the chance, at all. The assumption of subjectivity prohibits 
more precise statements on how prices affect individual decisions in case of H1. Simi-
lar to H4 are the ‘then-components’ of H2 and H3 suffering from ex ante ignorance. 
We know that under ignorance the market will be in disequilibrium and that conse-
quently opportunities exist, but there is no information about the degree of disequilib-
rium or the numbers and whereabouts of potential opportunities. Until those opportu-
nities are alertly recognized, no accurate statements about their properties can be 
made. The same goes for H5. It is stated that information dissolves in the course of 
time, but nothing can be precisely said about the speed of this dissolution or the num-
ber and qualities of the imitators. H6 suffers from the assumptions of methodological 
individualism, independent will and action, and subjectivism. Experience and learn-
ing are very individual phenomena. There may be an average rate of learning and a 
tendency towards more and more correct decisions, but a statement about single cases 
seems impossible. While offering a clear implication, H7 cannot be put more precise, 
as well. Due to individual decisions the equilibrating tendency may be weaker or 
stronger, slower or faster. Now it should have become obvious that the ‘then-
components’ of Austrian economics hypotheses’ offer only rather vague implications. 
Austrian economics offers a cause/effect-connection that allows to unambiguously 
describe and explain the path from disequilibrium to equilibrium through information 
and learning in a general way, but it is hard to dig deeper into detail. We know that a 
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state of disequilibrium will c.p. be resolved towards equilibrium if free market entry 
is possible, but not how long it will take and who will be involved when and in which 
way. Taken together, the high universality of the ‘if-components’ and the mediocre 
precision of the ‘then-component’ result in limited explanatory power of Austrian 
economics and limited empirical content. 
The logical scope of H1 is that prices do inform; incompatible would be a misinform-
ing, confusing or neutral role of prices. Compatible with hypothesis H2 is a state of 
disequilibrium, an equilibrium state is thus incompatible. H3 has the logical scope that 
arbitrage opportunities exist, while a lack of opportunities is incompatible. H4 has the 
logical scope that entrepreneurs will appear to profit from opportunities. Situations 
where no entrepreneurs appear are thus incompatible. H5 concerns the dissolution of 
information and appearance of imitation, which is its logical scope. If no information 
dissolves and no imitation happen, this is incompatible with H5. H6 postulates en-
hanced decision making. Worsened plans with respect to new information are incom-
patible. Finally, H7 is compatible with an equilibrating tendency, the notion of status 
quo or even disequilibrating tendencies is thus incompatible. The logical scope of the 
hypotheses put forward is always compatible with rather general phenomena, but 
nonetheless unambiguous. All hypotheses state a very clear implication. The fulfil-
ment of the ‘if-component’ calls for a definite reaction. Due to its generality, the logi-
cal scope must be evaluated as being of a medium size, which calls for limited em-
pirical content again. 
While a combination of small logical scope and high empirical content is an impor-
tant goal in theory construction, such hypotheses are particularly subject to the danger 
of falsification. The attempt to falsify hypotheses depends on the testability of hy-
potheses in reality through empirical studies. The superstructure of Austrianism, 
‘methodological individualism’, which means consciousness, free will and independ-
ent individual decisions, has an important implication for the whole complex of scien-
tific research based on it. Austrian economics derives all of its theoretical statements 
through introspection in order to interpret human action irrespectively of all environ-
mental, accidental, and individual circumstances.277 An important group in Austrian 
economics, consisting of inter alia Mises, Kirzner, Rizzo, and Rothbard, rejects em-
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pirical testing of Austrian hypotheses.278 As it is based on methodological individual-
ism, it is claimed that the entirety of empirical findings picture exclusively historical 
facts that are valid for a singular case under the given circumstances at that particular 
place and time. It is denied that empirical findings have any validity for human action 
in general or for the future, because the complexity of human decisions forbids obser-
vation of all relevant facts. Their methodological approach is called ‘Aristotelian’. It 
sees science as a descriptive enterprise, as a matter of qualitative laws governing the 
connections between certain essences or categories.279 This anti-historicism has be-
come the harshest criticism of Austrian economics.280 On the other hand, “[i]t is safe 
to say that no two Austrians have ever completely agreed on methodology […]”.281 It 
is Hayek who defends a more moderate methodological ground within the Austrian 
school. Although he agrees with the scholars mentioned above on the belief that no 
singular outcome can be predicted and thus empirically tested, he claims that empiri-
cal methods are useable. They allow finding and predicting structures, patterns and 
abstract order in the market process.282 Rizzo admits that statistical regularities are 
useful as a starting point for a theoretical investigation, insofar as they raise questions 
scientists could address themselves to.283 Until now, there is no known record of a 
falsification of Austrian economics. Unfortunately, this statement is troublesome. 
Theoreticians may construct hypotheses about market behaviour, e.g. about the 
equilibrating tendency, but two innate factors of Austrian economics are an obstacle 
to testing. If the postulated tendency towards equilibrium in a specified market is not 
found, the hypothesis or theory would normally be said to be falsified. In the Austrian 
framework, however, ad hoc explanations for contradictory findings are readily avail-
able. At first, there is the assumption about market actors who subjectively choose 
their ends in the market process. If natural or artificial barriers to entry into the mar-
ket can be ruled out, there may have been a spontaneous and subjective change in 
preferences that disturbed the whole market process. The second possibility for unex-
pected findings in empirical research are radical ignorance that hindered entrepre-
neurs to find a profitable opportunity, or vice versa the resolution of ignorance that 
led to surprising innovations of entrepreneurs, which can always interfere with testing 
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and are thus an obstacle for the development of clear statements and predictions 
based on Austrian economics.284 The caveat that has to be mentioned is that the stated 
hypotheses are valid only c.p., i.e. if no unforeseen change disrupts the process that 
possibly makes it start all over again. Under the given assumptions and without the 
ceteris paribus clause, Austrian economics is immunized and not falsifiable in a Pop-
perian sense anymore. In the social sciences, the deduction of hypotheses through 
introspection and logic does not justify untestability. Theories that immunize them-
selves are normally dismissed as sensible foundations of science. Marketing – and 
science in general – should not hide behind a theory that is not testable.285 Austrian 
economics, however, has had many critics during its history but was successfully de-
fended by its adherents for over 130 years now and is as vital as never before. Em-
pirical tests are carried out against the will and intentions of influential Austrian 
scholars, hoping to find support for general statements of Austrian economics. Even 
though the theory is immunized against contradictions, empirical findings based on 
Austrian theory are compatible with regular Austrian statements so far, without hav-
ing to rely on ad hoc immunization strategies. Shane e.g., using the case-study-
method, found empirical support for the hypothesis that entrepreneurs who differ in 
their initial resource and knowledge endowment will be alert to different possibilities 
to profit from a given technology. A particular entrepreneur is alert to profit opportu-
nities that someone else does not see, because he possesses idiosyncratic knowl-
edge.286 Zaheer and Zaheer conducted a study about profitability in the international 
banking sector. They found out that alertness to opportunities in disequilibrium exists, 
reveals profitable opportunities, and is an important factor in competition with other 
banks.287 Rese found explicative powers of Austrian economics for the behaviour of 
strategic groups in markets where high degrees of ignorance prevail.288 These find-
ings are encouraging. Austrian theory seems to work at least in an environment in 
which no sudden major changes take place during the scrutinized period, but further 
elaboration would be helpful. It would also help to dismiss the dogmatic anti-
historicism of Austrian economics and follow a Hayekian train of thought. It should 
be possible to assume that there are general, empirically testable patterns in the mar-
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ket process – or ultimately human behaviour – that are more or less stable over multi-
ple periods on an average across a large population. If a sample of a hundred people 
is regarded today who like the colour red best, it can be surely predicted that the 
overwhelming majority will still like red best tomorrow. Learning based on experi-
ence is an empirical occupation. If empirical findings cannot be generalized because 
all observations are valid for a singular case only, systematic learning about advanta-
geous opportunities in the marketplace and consequently the equilibrating tendencies 
of the market process become impossible. A buyer who finds an opportunity at a fa-
vourable price must always perceive it as a solitary opportunity, depending on the 
particular circumstances of time and place that may or may not be repeated at a later 
point in time or another place, if systematic learning is impossible. A seller is subject 
to the same uncertainty. An exchange partner who paid a favourable price may offer 
the same amount, a higher amount or a smaller amount under slightly different cir-
cumstances for the same good or service. Knowledge that was gained once cannot 
necessarily be assumed to be valid for the future. It follows that it is absolutely neces-
sary that experience and knowledge gained today are at least roughly applicable to 
tomorrow’s situation; else all learning is a Sisyphean task. It is true that human beings 
in their complexity will be never understood completely. But it is also true that cer-
tain variables in human behaviour are quite stable over time or follow a rather evolu-
tionary than revolutionary change. On these premises, generalizations and predictions 
about the future are possible. It would be helpful to find conditions that influence the 
occurrence of surprises and changes in preferences to support such generalizations 
and predictions. At the moment this seems utopian, but if such conditions were to be 
found and surprising changes could be isolated from the rest of the market process, 
the problem of immunization could be healed and hypotheses independent of unpre-
dictable events could be constructed.289 Other interesting questions yet to be answered 
are the conditions under which entrepreneurial alertness is fostered,290 e.g. if compa-
nies as a conglomerate of knowledge have an ‘alertness advantage’ over individuals. 
Does alertness determine the optimal firm size?291 Research and development de-
partments in companies could be organized according to such findings. Furthermore, 
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conditions that influence the dissemination of information or other conditions that 
accelerate equilibrating tendencies are interesting for marketing. Marketing managers 
who plan to imitate a particular offer could use such knowledge in order to hasten 
their effort of imitation, while innovators292 could, on the contrary, think of ways to 
prolong their monopolistic status in competition through slowing down the diffusion 
of knowledge. 
5.1.3 The ‘Triangular Problem’ in Austrian Economics 
Despite the aforementioned difficulties concerning the generality of Austrian hy-
pothesizing and possibilities of ad-hoc immunization, there are reasons for accepting 
Austrian economics as a basis for hypothesis generation in marketing in the present 
state of the world. The difficulties should naturally be borne in mind until further re-
search has resolved the problems and more evidence is found that supports Austrian 
economics. Until then the lack of testability puts up a problem concerning the truth of 
the theory. However, Austrian economics should be temporally accepted since hy-
potheses derived from Austrian economics offer an accurate picture of the equilibrat-
ing processes that take place and they could be verified in successful empirical trials 
so far. It was suggested in section 5.1.2 (pp. 34-40) that Austrian economics has only 
limited empirical content. Its strength and purpose is not to explain a singular event in 
the market, but it is a complete theory of the market process. In the field of economics 
and especially for marketing, Austrian economics is a novel theory. Admittedly, Aus-
trian economics looks back on a long and changeable history, but the hypotheses 
stemming from its body of work were and are genuinely original in comparison to 
other existing theories. There is no other theory that regards market coordination as 
thorough a process as Austrian economics. It is not only valid at different places, but 
especially across time due to its emphasis on dynamic processes. Austrian economics 
allows the formulation of completely different implications, especially in comparison 
to its microeconomic competitor of neoclassicism. In regard to the triangle of the con-
flicting demands of truth, empirical content and novelty, there is a weakness on the 
‘truth-edge’, and another one on the ‘empirical content-edge’ due to the limited preci-
sion of the hypothesis of Austrian economics, but a strong point on the ‘novelty-
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edge’. The weaknesses, though, are not grave enough to call Austrian economics a 
‘fantastic speculation’, ‘magic’ or ‘superstition’. 
5.2 Application of Austrian Economics as a Marketing Theory 
Now that the epistemological strength and weaknesses have been pointed out, poten-
tial applications of Austrian economics will be under scrutiny. Since Austrian eco-
nomics was originally conceptualized as an economic theory and not as a marketing 
theory, the congruence of marketing and Austrian economics has to be established. 
Does the scope of Austrian economics overlap with that of marketing theory? Is the 
theoretical spotlight pointing on marketing phenomena? The first impression of Aus-
trianism is highly valuable for marketing theory: profiting from economic activity is 
possible.  
5.2.1 Description and Explanation of Reality 
Since it is hard to draw the line between description and explanation, these two func-
tions of a theory will be treated simultaneously. Austrian economics in its present 
state is directed towards thorough description.293 Starting from the phenomenon of a 
disequilibrium market the whole process that resolves the incompatibility of plans 
and expectations towards equilibrium is described. The description includes time, 
knowledge, entrepreneurs, etc. The applicability as a marketing theory will be tested 
by seeing if Austrian economics is able to account for Hunt’s four basic explananda 
for marketing theory (see section 2.1, p. 5). 
(1) The behaviour of buyers directed at accomplishing exchanges: 
Austrian economics and marketing share an important understanding: Individual buy-
ers engage in exchanges of resources to be better off afterwards. Starting from a con-
dition that could be described with the behaviouristic state of cognitive dissonance294 
between the perception of the actual state and expectations about a preferable, imag-
ined state, the individual engages in certain activities that are supposed to peak in an 
exchange. An exchange or a number of consecutive exchanges is the culmination of 
marketing activities. In the acts of buying and selling resources change ownership and 
profits can be realised. Both buyers and sellers are interested in exchanges, because 
their respective situation is supposed to be enhanced afterwards. The parties that en-
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gage in an exchange must fulfil the condition of offering the partner the best opportu-
nity known and available. The element of time in Austrian economics explains why 
learning takes place in the period between the recognition of a problem, the exchange, 
and subsequent exchanges. The buyer has an amount of experience about goods and 
services that may solve his problem, and he may learn of other possibilities in the 
course of the market process. Since the ‘Austrian buyer’ has no perfect information, 
his evoked set is limited. He is alert to and consequently considers only a limited 
number of possible solutions. The decision process between different feasible out-
comes is strictly subjective. Consumers are not exclusively sensitive to prices, but the 
recognition of the consumers’ economizing behaviour accounts for the fact that they 
choose the cheapest item from a set of homogeneous goods. Actors with constrained 
knowledge consider qualitative and other aspects of the offers as well, the result being 
a strictly subjective willingness to pay for goods and services. 
The Austrian framework is also concerned with sudden changes in customer prefer-
ences. Changes are explained through the independent human mind that has its own 
will and power to choose goals. Excellent examples of sudden changes that affect 
business are found in the fashion- and toy-industries. A product, brand, label or de-
signer that was very fashionable or a ‘must-have’ yesterday might be totally démodé 
today. Who remembers all the Tamagotchis, Teletubbies and Pokemons that no child 
could live without a few years ago, but which live in oblivion now? In the course of 
time, dependant on learning and experience, trends change and customers today 
might not be willing to pay a cent for something they placed a high value on yester-
day. The view that Austrian economics has of market actors who engage in buying is 
close to actual behaviour. It accounts for many facets of human behaviour. 
(2) The behaviour of sellers directed at accomplishing exchanges: 
Two kinds of sellers must be distinguished in the Austrian framework. At first, there 
are sellers who are resource owners by natural endowment or earlier alertness. If they 
are not alert to opportunities because they suffer from too much ignorance or are sim-
ply not courageous enough to grasp an opportunity, they will not make a profit. This 
class of sellers is not very interesting for marketing. The interesting personification of 
a seller in Austrian economics is the second class of people, who Kirzner called en-
trepreneurs. It is the entrepreneur who generates a profit from buying and selling. It is 
justified to say that his qualities and his coordinating activities in markets that are 
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subject to ignorance are at the centre of Austrian economics. Entrepreneurs are driven 
by the search for profitable opportunities. Profitable opportunities vitally depend on 
customer desires and wishes, because it is the final user of a good or service who de-
termines its price in affluent societies. The realization that it is the customer who de-
cides about winners and losers in the market process puts Austrian economics very 
close to marketing. Successful entrepreneurial activity in the marketplace depends on 
fulfilling customer desires. A market segmentation that addresses market actors with 
different tastes and preferences is facilitated. Sellers have to produce the right product 
or service at a competitive price, make it known via informational means and have it 
sold at a place the buyer is willing to visit. Austrian economics thus describes and 
explains the employment of the four classical marketing-mix instruments (4 P’s). 
Austrian theory is a truly marketing-friendly theory because it integrates the costs for 
the creation of information into the manufacturing costs of the associated product.295  
The entrepreneur in the Austrian framework as someone who is always alert to profit-
able opportunities is not necessarily restricted to exchanges of consumer goods or of 
commercial exchanges in general. The applicability or rather the descriptive and ex-
planative powers of the Austrian entrepreneur in resource-markets or intermediate-
good-markets are a matter of course. The addressees of the sellers’ marketing strategy 
are individuals in the end. Individuals in their function as employees of a company 
are not directly trying to subjectively maximize their own utility, but that of their re-
spective companies, but as human beings they more or less show the same behaviour 
like consumers. Austrian economics is theoretically applicable for exchanges within 
organizations, if the internal organisation employs signals like artificial transfer-
prices. If the transfer-prices have a correct value or are intentionally set to promote 
specific goals and are not misleading due to ignorance, they will unfold the same 
processes as in external markets with internal entrepreneurs driving prices to an equi-
librium level. Several factories of a car-manufacturing enterprise could e.g. compete 
for the production of a new car. Within an organization, though, it is difficult to imag-
ine that there are no rules prohibiting the free entry of all departments into all kinds of 
activities, e.g. of the marketing department into accounting, if they think that they can 
do it cheaper and better. It is also difficult to fully embrace the entrepreneur in non-
profit organizations. Austrian economics states that human actors’ ends are not neces-
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sarily solely advanced by making profits or buying goods and services to fulfil a ma-
terial need. Actors’ individuality accounts for people who feel better by helping other 
people, animals, the environment, or by enjoying religious feelings. Entrepreneurs 
(sellers) can create or shape charitable offers suited to customer (fol-
lower/worshipper) desires in order to maximize donations, but the idea of the infor-
mational role of prices and of the process of competition that drives down prices be-
comes irrelevant. Donations are voluntarily and hardly comparable to the price of a 
commercial good or service. It is hard to believe that a faithful Catholic switches to 
Protestantism because the expected donations are lower. The donator may be inter-
ested in an efficient use of his donations, but the amount (or price) he is willing to 
donate depends exclusively on other factors. It follows that Austrian economics is 
best applied for commercial exchanges. 
Austrian economics permits that marketing takes time. Some measures of the market-
ing strategy are conducted simultaneous, but it is often a chronological process of 
planning, coordinating and executing. Marketing is also preparing the exchange 
transaction. Its role is to make potential buyers aware of the desirable features of a 
good or service. Potential buyers are actively working towards the exchange of re-
sources after their indoctrination via marketing means. This notion is impossible in 
static theories. Sellers may conduct a certain strategy and measure its impact over 
time. Sales numbers and data are a constant test of hypotheses about the attractiveness 
of their offer. Significant changes in demand mean either that customer preferences 
changed or that new competitors appeared in the marketplace. Entrepreneur-
marketers may compare their strategy to competing ones. They can learn from earlier 
mistakes and revise their strategy. This dynamic perception of time is also necessary 
to account for relationship marketing. Sellers can positively influence the subjective 
perception of buyers in earlier periods in order to gain an advantage in later periods, 
since transactions are not independent. Given perfect information and hence no trans-
action costs whatsoever, all buyers and sellers would engage only in independent 
transactions. In Austrian economics, relationships that reduce ignorance and insecu-
rity are valuable. 
(3) The institutional framework directed at accomplishing and/or facilitating ex-
changes: 
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Real institutions human beings created to accomplish and facilitate exchange are well 
explained in Austrian theory. The first one is the market. In a market, buyer and seller 
or demander and supplier meet in order to exchange their resources, which will ex-
pectedly make both better off afterwards. Markets may consist of two parties, if sub-
jectivity predominates and the alertness of both parties is restricted. They may consist 
of multiple parties, if more than one seller made the potential buyers aware of his 
offer and/or if more than one buyer shows interest in the available means. Only here 
can the equilibrating powers of competition unfold. Nowadays markets sometimes 
consist of almost the entire world, because modern information technology like the 
internet offers new and cheap opportunities of communication between buyers and 
sellers. A market is thus not a fixed territorial place, but the variable result of infor-
mational activities on both sides of the buyer-seller dichotomy. The second institu-
tion, money, facilitates exchange by enhancing the signalling value of prices. A 
common denominator for all goods and services, like money, makes the comparison 
of prices much easier compared to a barter economy. With the term of ‘institution’ 
Hunt also refers to intermediaries in the market process, such as wholesalers, retailers 
and agents engaged in transportation, warehousing, advertising, or market research.296 
The first two are entrepreneurs themselves. They take title in goods and alertly try to 
exploit opportunities to better fulfil customer desires for distribution. The other 
groups are auxiliary forces in the market process. They aid entrepreneurs to achieve 
an optimal marketing mix of information, time, place, product properties, and price. 
The fourth institution is the system of laws of a state and the property rights the laws 
protect. Both are not explicitly explained in the core of Austrian economics. They are 
exogenously given, but play an important role in securing free market entry and a 
voluntary and orderly exchange of resources. A totally free market entry is utopian in 
the present state of the world. Austrian competition is hindered through various laws, 
like patent legislation and bureaucratic obstacles. One country that switched from 
central planning of the economy to a system with freer market entry and private prop-
erty rights is China. It is an example of the vast success of private entrepreneurship in 
facilitating exchanges. The move to economic liberalization started late in the year 
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1978 and resulted in “[…] two decades of sustained high economic growth rates of 
between 10 and 11 percent annually compounded”.297 
(4) Consequences on society of the behaviour of the buyer, seller, and the institu-
tional framework directed at accomplishing and/or facilitating exchanges: 
Comparably free market entry and stable institutions have led to the development of 
economies in the Western hemisphere as we know them today. Private entrepreneur-
ship that appreciated consumer sovereignty has resulted in our affluent society and 
has led to a vast number of choices from which consumers may satisfy their diversi-
fied needs. Sometimes the consumers’ power led to an availability of certain goods 
and services anytime and everywhere. Consumers in affluent societies are subject to a 
constant stream of information. Entrepreneurs try to alert consumers to their opportu-
nity and convince them that their offer is the best. Mises stated in 1949 that advertis-
ing gets continuously shriller and displays the bad taste of the public (see section 
4.2.3, p. 29). For someone living in the 21st century, advertising from the 1940s and 
1950s appears reserved and boring, while present strategies of gaining attention in-
deed seem to have gotten more aggressive. This is e.g. reflected in the famous adver-
tising campaign of Benetton in the 1990s, which showed the bloody garments of 
civil-war victims, a death-row inmate and people suffering from HIV. However, 
sometimes loud advertising campaigns do not work. The success of discount super-
markets shows that customers do not always perceive the subjective superior value of 
heavily advertised and branded products. The lower price of private brand goods is 
often preferred to the subjectively higher esteem of branded goods. Here we are in the 
mainstream of Austrian economics. It is possible to recognize price- and non-price-
competition and to explain ex post how and why it occurs. It is impossible, though, to 
predict ex ante which one is more important in the decision process of market actors.  
The economic phenomenon of the globalization of production with all its influences 
on society is connected to the competition for the lowest price. Austrian economics 
offers a perfect explanation for “[…] the sourcing of goods and services from loca-
tions around the globe to take advantage of national differences in the cost and quality 
of factors of production (such as labour, energy, land, and capital). By doing this, 
companies hope to lower their overall cost structure and/or improve the quality or 
functionality of their product offer, thereby allowing them to compete more effec-
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tively”.298 After the resolution of the conflict between the eastern communist bloc and 
the western democratic bloc various new opportunities arose. In many former Com-
munist countries and in countries that were outside the western trade system the insti-
tutional framework changed towards a more liberal economic system, that is more 
closely connected to the west. On their eternal quest to offer attractive opportunities 
to the consumer – either through lower prices or better quality for their goods and 
services – alert entrepreneurs started to produce in reformed countries if labour was 
cheaper than in Western countries. Meanwhile, the production of various kinds of 
goods and services has moved from developed countries to developing countries, a 
movement that started with the production of labour-intensive goods and went on to 
software programming, accounting and tax calculations. A classic example is the pro-
duction of colour-TV-sets, originally an innovation from the United States that was 
later imitated by entrepreneurs in Japan and Germany. Even later the production of 
TV-sets moved to South Korea, and nowadays to China. In the course of this move-
ment, production costs were continuously sinking and consumer prices were sinking 
strongly as well compared to the average income of workers in the Western hemi-
sphere. Prices for many goods could not be as cheap as they are, if it was not for en-
trepreneurs who saw those opportunities. Many entrepreneurs (or entrepreneurial 
companies) are selling very profitably, because they still have a temporary monopoly 
on differentiated goods and services or because they can produce more cheaply than 
their competitors. Some are alertly exploiting the differential between wages in the 
developed countries and developing countries. Textile workers in various Chinese 
factories e.g. got paid between $0.13 and $0.35 per hour for up to 93-hour working 
weeks in 1998, compared to $10 and $18.50 per hour in 1996 in the United States and 
Germany, respectively.299 Hayek’s insight that those will produce something who are 
able to craft it for the lowest price is verified. The market process may not yet have 
reached a state of equilibrium. Workers in Africa are potentially accepting even lower 
wages, but problems in regard to political and social stability and property rights hin-
der the exploitation of such opportunities. Another societal phenomenon is explica-
ble: product piracy, i.e. the illegal imitation and selling of products. If laws are not 
enforced strongly enough, pirate-entrepreneurs perceive a chance to participate from 
the informational expenditures other entrepreneurs incurred. 
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Austrian economics has strong descriptive and explicative powers for all aspects of 
marketing theory. The first criterion of Hempel and Oppenheim (see section 3.3.1, p. 
17) is fulfilled, too. It is possible to logically deduct a number of phenomena from 
Austrian economics. The law needed is given by the elaboration of Austrian econom-
ics based on its various assumptions. Empirical content and truth of Austrian econom-
ics have been evaluated before and found to be of a restricted degree. The demand of 
the independence of explanans and explanandum is, of course, problematic due to the 
immunization tendencies of Austrian economics. 
5.2.2 Prediction of Incidents and Technological Use 
The inherent complexity of human actors, the economic system and a lack of knowl-
edge is problematic for the predictive qualities of Austrian economics. It is impossi-
ble to control the secondary conditions about human preferences and about the disso-
lution of radical ignorance, which is responsible for innovations. Kirkpatrick defends 
the point of view that Austrian economics is incapable of generating predictions about 
the future. He pragmatically suggests that marketing based on Austrian economics 
should use consumer psychology and extrapolations of market research data as auxil-
iary methods in order to gain speculative insight into the future.300 It is due to this 
weakness in prediction that Austrian economics could not take the position in eco-
nomic and marketing science it deserves, if we take a look at its strong descriptive 
powers. The possibility of predicting general patterns of the market process is analo-
gous to the hypotheses set up in section 4.3 (see pp. 31f.). If we accept the hypotheses 
H1 to H7 as law-like generalizations, we can deduct the following prognoses from a 
tautological transformation: 
P1: Prices serve as a means of communicating information. 
P2: Markets suffering from ignorance will be in disequilibrium. 
P3: Opportunities for arbitrage exist in a market that is in disequilibrium. 
P4: Alert entrepreneurs appear to exploit opportunities. 
P5: Information about entrepreneurial activities spreads in the market in the course of 
time and attracts imitators. 
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P6: Experience and learning result in enhanced decision-making and plans that mutu-
ally fit better. 
P7: An equilibrating tendency begins. 
Using these predictions allows us to say that alert entrepreneurs will perceive price 
signals and try to find profit opportunities in disequilibrium markets (P1, P2, P3, P4). 
The assumptions of Austrian economics are unfortunately an obstacle to the control 
of the secondary conditions. Due to radical ignorance, the independent human mind 
and subjectivism we are not able to predict when the entrepreneurs will appear, how 
many there are, where to find the opportunities, and the value of the opportunities. 
Innovators can be successful – at least for a certain period of time – but they can also 
mistake consumer desires and incur losses. What we can surely say is that success in 
the market depends on the correct anticipation of customer needs and selling the ac-
cordingly designed item for a competitive price. The dissolution of information that 
will inevitably happen in the marketplace will sooner or later attract competition (P5). 
If the proliferation of goods and services continues it is possible to predict that adver-
tisements will become even more shrill and noisy, given constant tastes and capabili-
ties of consumers, because offers must be made known to customers. Learning and 
experience in the course of time will enhance the actors’ decisions and start an equili-
brating market process (P6, P7). Entrepreneurs must be aware of imitators and be pre-
pared to handle a continuous compulsion to innovate. Teece holds the caveat that, 
although Austrian economics predicts that innovative entrepreneurs are most success-
ful, it is often an imitator who reaps the greatest benefits.301 This notion is certainly 
true but can be explained because there is more to economic success than the right 
product: the right marketing-mix. 
5.2.3 Austrian Economics as a Device for Criticism 
Austrian economics emphasises the superior transmission of information in markets, 
which results in better fulfilment of consumer needs as opposed to centralised plan-
ning, especially in Communist societies.302 History showed that Austrians were right 
in the ‘socialist calculation debate’ with their claim that central planners do not have 
all the relevant knowledge to calculate equilibrium prices and provide consumers 
with an optimal amount of goods and services. Whereas institutions are accepted for 
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the functioning of the market process, government interventions are criticized, be-
cause they enhance the market process only by chance. Subjective governmental in-
terference into the forces of the market process can never be superior to the vast 
amount of market knowledge and will thus cause only additional bias. The banning of 
tobacco advertising in cinemas and on TV in the European Union e.g. biases the mar-
ket process in the relevant market. Differentiated or cheaper offers cannot be adver-
tised effectively anymore and the flow of information is hindered. The overall effect 
on the abuse of tobacco products is dubious. An implication of this governmental 
intervention is the fact that the current position of incumbent tobacco products is for-
tified. The same criticism is true for interventions in other fields: Given a set of rules 
that secure property rights and free market exchange, it would be economically effi-
cient to have as few interventions as possible. However, Austrian economics does not 
make normative statements about the moral and ethical value of interventions. 
Austrian economics is often used to criticize neoclassicism on the ground of the more 
realistic assumptions of Austrianism. Neoclassicism does not account for any facet of 
marketing because of the assumption of perfect knowledge and actors who maximize 
given goals in the highly unrealistic state of perfect competition.303 In the neoclassic 
equilibrium framework all profits have been competed away and there are no profits 
to be reaped anymore. However, both schools have common understandings. Many 
Austrians regard equilibrium as the final stage of the coordination process in a distant 
future. It is a state in which all signals are correctly perceived in such a manner that 
all plans and decisions of market actors align. This is exactly the basic tenet of neo-
classicism: complete information is crucial for equilibrium. Some ideas of neoclassi-
cism could be integrated into the Austrian framework on this condition. Connected to 
the criticism of missing realism in neoclassic theory is the criticism of a school of 
strategy called ‘Industrial organisation’ (IO), which is based on neoclassicism. Aus-
trian scholars claim that IO relies on an insufficient theoretical structure, is ignorant 
to change due to its static equilibrium thinking and does not explain entrepreneurial 
efforts to innovate.304 Profits do not depend on successful differentiation from compe-
tition but on the exertion of monopoly power.305 A consistency of another theory with 
Austrian economics does, in contrast to IO, exist. Hunt claims that the ‘Resource ad-
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vantage theory’ is consistent with Austrian economics and could provide the founda-
tions for developing an Austrian theory of competition.306 A superficial comparison 
shows that there are common grounds of Austrian economics and NIE, since both are 
interested in the problems and effects of ignorance and the importance of information. 
Furthermore, psychological research could prove fruitful to elaborate on the market 
actors’ subjectivity and decision processes.307 Theories like the confirma-
tion/disconfirmation-paradigm308 and the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance309 
resemble and seem consistent with the problem-solving behaviour of the Austrian 
decider. Another potential for the integration of theoretical knowledge into Austrian 
economics is the Bass Model mentioned in section 2.2 (pp. 7f.). The diffusion of in-
novative products depends on the availability of knowledge about them. It is possible 
to perceive the Bass Model as the empirical proof for certain Austrian claims and it 
can be very well related to Austrian economics. Knowledge about offers, e.g. spread 
through advertising effort, alerts customers of a new and advantageous opportunity. 
Since the diffusion of information in a market grows over time, demand for such 
products rises. Later, new information will slowly but steadily overlap with old in-
formation after the introduction of the next innovation and deduct demand from the 
old offer, so that the overall demand for the old offer declines again. 
5.3 Implications of Austrian Economics for Influencing Transaction 
Processes: The Entrepreneur as the Marketing-Manager 
The attempt to derive implications from Austrian economics to influence transaction 
processes confronts us again with the problems of immunization and unpredictability 
of single events. The missing property of unambiguous prediction of Austrian eco-
nomics is consistent with the real world.310 The outcome of marketing activities is 
uncertain and marketers speculate about future events, too. Since peoples’ preferences 
and tastes continuously change,311 most product innovations – even if they have been 
tried in a market test – do not succeed financially. Still, marketing activities are essen-
tial for the functioning of the market process. The marketing-task of the entrepreneur 
is to employ all tools of regular marketing-management to facilitate exchanges, be-
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cause certain conditions have to be fulfilled before an exchange takes place. Making 
use of the classical marketing-mix of product-quality, pricing policy, distribution and 
promotional activities is a clear implication of Austrian economics. All of these vari-
ables will influence transaction processes. 
Meyer claims that the entrepreneurial role in Austrian economics is identical to mar-
ket-oriented business leadership as understood in modern marketing.312 The picture of 
marketing that was put forward in the three definitions by Meffert, the AMA, and 
Kotler/Bliemel (see section 2.1, p. 3) has as well striking similarities with the Aus-
trian entrepreneur. Austrian theorists and marketing theorists share the common un-
derstanding that customer satisfaction is a necessity for successful exchanges. Both 
entrepreneur and the manager of the marketing function want to generate exchanges 
of resources. If either the entrepreneur or the marketing-manager mistakes or ignores 
the primacy of the consumer, he will not sell enough and be driven out of the market. 
There is also an empirical difference between the Austrian entrepreneur and the mar-
keting-manager. Many people occupied with marketing do not work independently. 
The stereotypical marketing-manager is an employee of a big consumer-goods com-
pany. Questions arise if these managers are not alert enough to work on their own 
account or which advantages they enjoy within an organization. 
5.3.1 The Pricing Policy in the Competitive Environment 
The market actors’ economizing behaviour suggests that the first instrument of the 
classical marketing mix, price, is the crucial sales argument for homogeneous goods. 
Buyers will choose the least expensive out of a number of identical offers. Price sig-
nals that are statements about a shortage or an excess supply of goods or services and 
information that is available in the marketplace must be correctly perceived, proc-
essed and evaluated. Marketing-managers can find out if a competitor reaps profits 
with his offer, if signals are correctly perceived and interpreted. The sellers will take 
the chance to imitate a successful idea of competing entrepreneurs whenever and 
wherever possible in order to participate from profits. Various sellers who sell a ho-
mogeneous good have to compete on price until all profit opportunities have disap-
peared. Being successful in such an environment implies being the seller with the 
lowest price. This implies an essential informational task for all market participants, 
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but especially for the marketing-manager or the entrepreneur. All producers of homo-
geneous goods or services, whether it is the original inventor or an imitator, have to 
be alert to superior production techniques to fabricate cheaper than competition. To 
employ the most advanced or cheapest production technique is the only way that sell-
ers can stay ahead of competition in a market for homogeneous goods. This implies 
e.g. that the globalization of production and the movement of production sites to de-
veloping countries needs to and will continue. We can expect the end of that move-
ment in a distant future, if all wages for workers who have the same skills in produc-
ing a good or service have been equalized on the whole planet (given free market 
entry). The customers will profit from the search for better production techniques due 
to increased supplies at cheaper prices because of lower production costs. Marketing-
driven companies will move the relevant markets toward equilibrium, but the final 
resolution of disequilibrium towards the neoclassic idea of market clearance seems to 
be an empirical exception.313 An implication of using prices in terms of money in-
stead of cows, bushels of wheat and pieces of pottery in a barter-economy, or en-
hanced spreading of information in general, is that competition will c.p. be fiercer and 
the equilibrating processes will be faster on average. 
5.3.2 The Product Policy: Adapting to Customer Preferences 
The most important insight of Austrian economics that is relevant to marketing is that 
the customer is the most powerful actor in the market process and the centrepiece of 
entrepreneurial endeavour. Transactions take place only if the customer perceives 
additional benefit compared to a competing solution or to no exchange at all. This is 
good news for consumers, because entrepreneurs need to do, produce, and sell almost 
everything that fulfils consumers’ desires and needs. Entrepreneurs must be aware 
that they can only be profitable, if they are committed to constant alertness and con-
sumer service. The second marketing-mix instrument is thus product quality. The 
differentiation of product qualities is the only way of escaping from fierce price-
competition and being profitable. 
Market actors seem to have an infinite desire for new and differentiated products to 
fulfil their individual needs. Sometimes customers formulate such desires, but often 
their radical ignorance hinders them to think of things that do not yet exist. Active 
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and passive search for solutions to customer problems both buyers and sellers are still 
ignorant about is necessary to outpace competitors. Austrian economics claims that 
entrepreneurs must be sensitive to such explicit or implicit requests since differentia-
tion allows profits to be reaped at least for a limited period because of the monopolis-
tic position. Both the entrepreneur and/or the marketing-manager are forced to accept 
losses as well as profits in this attempt. They are subject to the same constraints on 
human rationality (subjectivism, ignorance) like potential buyers. As human beings 
their decisions are sometimes right and sometimes wrong, since the future is un-
known. A mistaken perception of market information causes losses. Entrepreneurs 
whose success is below average will be forced to leave the market sooner or later. 
Resources will flow toward entrepreneurs who correctly perceive consumers’ desires 
and only those entrepreneurs who push the market process towards a higher equilib-
rium will survive in the market process.314 The people who are currently working in 
the field of marketing are successful enough in the fulfilment of consumer desires to 
keep the majority of the world population from entering into entrepreneurial activi-
ties. 
Another implication of Austrian economics is that the longer the period of monopo-
listic power in a market, the larger will be the profit of the monopolist. Thus, trying to 
prolong the duration of a monopoly is an important goal for marketing in the market 
process. A recommendation that is incompatible with the ideals of Austrianism for 
keeping a monopolistic position could be to lobby lawmakers to prohibit entry of 
competitors into the market in question. Austrian economics accepts monopolies, as 
long as they stem from competition and free market entry is possible. The competitive 
way for entrepreneurs to stay ahead of competition is to find or develop a resource or 
skill crucial for production that cannot be easily imitated. This may be the sole access 
to a natural resource like oil or gold, or it may be the access to the human resources of 
people with unique skills or non-transferable knowledge, or knowing a formula like 
the secret recipe of Coca Cola, or owning the property rights of a patent that prohibits 
the imitation of something particular. None of these possibilities promises profits for-
ever, though. An oil well may run dry, or a gold mine may be exhausted. A human 
being may lose his unique skills or knowledge, a secret formula can be stolen and 
copied and a patent expires after a certain period of time. Furthermore, tastes, prefer-
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ences and technology change. These inevitable changes imply an infinite number of 
disequilibria, which is equal to a constant stream of profit opportunities on the one 
hand, but on the other hand the goods and services under protection may not be 
sought after anymore, which implies that flexibility and constant openness to change 
and innovation are crucial for success in the marketplace. 
Current consumer criticism claiming that conformity of style and taste etc (see section 
2.3, p. 9) are the result of mass-marketing is supposed to be resolved in Austrian the-
ory, as long as a further differentiation of those items is profitable. Global branding 
and global uniformity of product- and service-offers is limited by the will of consum-
ers to accept and pay for those goods and services. It is the homogeneous preference 
of the consumers for the food of McDonald’s that makes McDonald’s sell the same 
food on a global scale. If everybody is free to choose, the reproach to marketing as 
being the source of uniformity is inappropriate, because the customer is the source of 
uniformity. Customers with similar preferences will thus compel entrepreneurs to sell 
homogeneous products. National, regional and rarely even individual differences in 
taste make the market process find another, more differentiated solution to customers’ 
problems, if the entrepreneur can gain profit in fulfilling more diverse desires. The 
degree of individualization of transaction processes that is still profitable will be 
found out in the course of the market process, because a trade-off between increased 
differentiation on the one hand and increased production costs (like a lack of econo-
mies of scale, reduced effects of learning, increased informational desires) on the 
other hand will prevail. Learning and gaining experience does not only take place in 
regard to the product, but the distribution and communication strategy are affected, as 
well. Different customers respond to different informational means and are aware of 
goods and services at different locations. 
5.3.3 The Communication Policy: Selling Gas-Which-Is-Known-About 
Entrepreneurs or marketing-managers in the market process do not only perceive in-
formation to find out about opportunities and set prices, but they must employ an ac-
tive means of influencing the market process on their own: deliberately sending in-
formation to alert the buyers about existing opportunities, because exchanges can 
only take place if the two potential parties to the exchange know of each other’s offer. 
Kirzner claims that the owner of a gas station must not simply offer gas. If nobody 
recognizes the gas-station, not a single gallon of gas will be sold. His task is “[…] to 
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supply gas-which-is-known-about […]”.315 Even if an opportunity has an advanta-
geous price or superior qualities, the ignorant buyer will not select it because of his 
radical ignorance. To resolve this ignorance, the third instrument of the marketing-
mix – the advertising or, more generally, the communication strategy – is used. It is 
explicitly mentioned in Austrian economics, especially in the works of Mises and 
Kirzner. It is an important means of spreading information in the market process, 
apart from price signals. Communication about products and their particular advan-
tages is responsible for the broad range of choices consumers enjoy today. It is neces-
sary to make consumers aware of the diverse possibilities to relieve perceived prob-
lems; sometimes advertising has to awaken feelings of uneasiness which encourage 
the consumer to search for a solution towards his problem. 
Austrian marketing-managers can make use of the communication- and distribution-
strategy to convince customers of the advantages of their particular offers besides 
offering a product that fulfils a customer need at a competitive price. Human actors’ 
property of subjectivism implies that advertising can influence the subjective percep-
tion of value. Marketing can alter human actors’ tastes and preferences in a desired 
direction. Thus it is not absolutely necessary to offer the objectively best opportunity 
in a market. It is enough to have the subjectively best one. Modern marketing can and 
often does transcend the objective value of a product by emphasising subjective quali-
ties like ‘image’ or ‘spirit’. Some consumers endorse the image a brand or good 
represents through buying the good in question. Their willingness to pay for such a 
good is often much higher than for a good that does not contain value that was added 
by communicative means. Some designer-labels for clothes e.g. add that much extra-
value through information to their products that they are able to exploit consumers’ 
subjectivism. These companies can charge the multiple amount of money for the 
same basic good such as a jeans or T-shirt in comparison to another competitor who 
is not that much involved in heavy advertising or who is not as successful with his 
communicative strategy. 
The chances of engaging in an exchange are subject to the amount of information 
both parties possess. If someone objectively has the best offer available but is un-
known to potential partners, he will not succeed in the market process. The potential 
market for a certain offer is enlarged through the information of customers. In a world 
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of overstimulation only the loud voices will be heard. Put differently, the more people 
know about an offer, the bigger will the potential market for this offer be. A change 
of price is c.p. not the only possibility to reach more customers. A market is inde-
pendently enlarged in Austrian economics by reaching new customers via informa-
tion. Recent developments in information technology like the World Wide Web have 
opened many new opportunities to reach customers in almost all parts of the world. 
Auction platforms in the internet, like eBay, make use of these enhanced informa-
tional capabilities to bring together buyers and sellers from all continents. The impor-
tance of problems referring to the quality of the product, the buyer, and the seller may 
rise in the virtual marketplace compared to a face-to-face exchange but the transpar-
ency of the pricing mechanism and the size of the market, which is potentially only 
limited to the number of the human population are important advantages that enhance 
market processes. Even though exchanges are dyadic, both buyers and sellers need to 
pay attention to competitive offers and bidders. It is advantageous for both sides of 
the exchange to know of a relevant market that is as large as possible, because then it 
is possible to compare and evaluate different offers. Competitive bidders are, like the 
buyer and seller, in a constant process of learning to offer and accept better opportu-
nities than before. 
A seller who at least once engaged in an exchange with a buyer has a certain informa-
tional advantage. The buyer is not radically ignorant about the categories or types of 
product- and service-offers of the seller anymore. It is easier to inform a person who 
is already aware of the company about related and follow-up offers. An initial ex-
change can thus become the starting-point for a number of exchanges. Yet, the occur-
rence of experience and learning can take a turn for the worse for the position of the 
exchange partner in a subsequent period, if the initial exchange was unsatisfactory for 
one or both sides. 
5.3.4 The Distribution Strategy in the Market Process 
Finally, the fourth instrument – the distribution strategy – has only a small place in 
Austrian economics. The marketing-manager needs to care for a good distributional 
strategy, because a need-satisfying product must not only be known to the addressee, 
but it must also be readily available. A consumer who is alert to an offer but does not 
know where to satisfy his demand may be reluctant to invest too many resources in 
the reduction of his ignorance about this product feature. The market process forces 
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the seller to secure a distribution strategy that makes his offers available at all places 
where it is worthwhile. Some products may be valuable only in particular places; e.g. 
the market chances for air conditioning will be larger in Florida than in Norway, but 
things like clothes and food are valuable almost anywhere where human population is 
found. 
 
6 Conclusions and Summary 
Even though Austrian economics is a theory with a high potential as a general mar-
keting theory, it is probably not the one theory that will unite all marketing research-
ers and help to overcome all problems of marketing theory, because unfortunately 
some important impediments limit its possibilities. The good news is that Austrian 
economics and marketing are both interested in the explanation of market phenomena 
and their origin in human action.316 The reproach of mainstream economists that mar-
keting is a waste of economic resources317 becomes obsolete in Austrian economics. 
The whole market process would, quite to the contrary, come to a halt in a state of 
disequilibrium without the information that is spread by marketing measures. The 
information about opportunities allows buyers to reduce ignorance and to express 
their will through channelling resources to efficient purposes. Information is further-
more responsible for enlarging markets. Economies of scale can only be realised in a 
large market. It follows that marketing is responsible for lower production costs, 
fiercer competition between different sellers and, finally, prices that are closer to 
equilibrium than they would be without the possibility of spreading information 
through advertising. An empirical look at real markets supports this idea: Buyers and 
sellers gather experience; they learn if they paid too much or asked too little. Profit-
able opportunities erode in competition, but as the process takes time, opportunities 
temporarily exist – sometimes vanishing fast, sometimes fading away slowly.318 The 
other instruments of the marketing-mix are part of Austrian economics, too. Pricing 
policy, product policy, and distribution policy based on Austrianism offer valuable 
implications to be successful in the marketplace. Focusing on the customer and being 
always alert to his obvious and hidden desires is the main idea for marketing in order 
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to engage in exchanges. Austrian economics is best applied to commercial exchanges 
that are driven by the profit motive. It is conceivable to apply it to marketing in inter-
nal markets, but some difficulties arise if Austrian economics is applied to non-profit 
marketing. 
The strength of Austrian economics as a marketing theory is in its descriptive and 
explicative powers. It has become apparent that Austrian economics is very well 
suited to describe and explain the two basic phenomena of marketing, i.e. why people 
and organizations engage in exchange relations and how these exchanges are created, 
resolved, or avoided. Buyers strive to subjectively maximize their independently cho-
sen goals in the market. They engage in exchanges which help them reaching their 
individual goals. These exchanges create a positive net value. Sellers as the opposing 
party of the exchange are trying to maximize their own ends. They are first and fore-
most driven by the profit-motive, but Austrian economics is accepting other motives 
as well, as long as market prices are an unambiguous signal of supply and demand for 
a good or service. Mutual alertness in regard to opportunities improves the situation 
of all parties in the marketplace. Information is thus a valuable good in Austrian eco-
nomics. Austrian economics describes the qualities of the entrepreneur as being bun-
dled in alertness. These qualities are aggressiveness, boldness, creativeness, and lead-
ership qualities (see section 4.2.2, p. 27). It would be an interesting task to find out if 
people who are successful marketing-managers are characterised by the same quali-
ties. 
Austrian economics describes and explains institutions that are relevant for exchanges 
and it can account for consequences on the society of the behaviour of the buyer, 
seller, and the institutional framework. It is a valuable theory for criticism of societal 
circumstances and other theories which claim importance for marketing. It e.g. allows 
criticizing Communist central planning and government interventions. Competing 
theories like neoclassic microeconomics are criticized with the claim of the superior-
ity of Austrianism. Furthermore, it was shown that both the neoclassic and behaviour-
istic, as well as the Resource-advantage theory and genuine marketing theories like 
the Bass-Model can be related to or integrated into Austrian economics. Due to these 
innate qualities, Austrian economics can claim credibility as a general marketing the-
ory. 
 62
The limitations of Austrian economics are intrinsic in its assumptions. While they are 
a good reflection of real deciders and decision-making in the marketplace, they are 
causal of the immunization tendencies of Austrianism. The assumption of radical ig-
norance, subjectivism and the free will of the individual to choose, change and create 
are an obstacle to empirical testing of the hypotheses of Austrian economics. They 
open the possibility of ad-hoc explanations of empirical findings that are contradic-
tory to theoretical implications. Thus, the falsifiability of Austrian economics in a 
Popperian sense is excluded. It becomes possible to derive regularities or statements 
of invariance only, if certain traits are assumed to be stable over a certain period. 
Then it is possible to derive rather general rules from Austrian economics in its pre-
sent form for marketers to influence transaction processes. Austrian economics has a 
strong point in regard to the novelty of its implications in comparison to other theo-
ries in marketing. Its weaker points, which are its limited truth and especially its lim-
ited empirical content, determine the predictive power of Austrian economics and its 
potential of technological usage. It is impossible to derive flawless prognoses from 
Austrian economics since the secondary conditions human behaviour cannot be ac-
tively controlled. ‘Austrian’ techniques or policies must be taken with a grain of salt 
as decision rules for marketing decision makers. There are some empirical studies on 
basis of ‘Austrian hypotheses’, but further research that could help to heal the weak-
nesses of Austrianism is desirable. A first step could be to compare ‘Austrian predic-
tions’ with historical data. Then, research on limited problems within the limits of 
Austrian economics could serve to derive specific implications to influence transac-
tion processes, until the causes of the occurrence of surprises and the dissolution of 
radical ignorance are perhaps found at some point in the future. 
The work at hand has analysed the potentials and limitations of Austrian economics 
in regard to marketing theory. In order to do that, the realm of marketing has been 
shown at first. Next, epistemological principles were described and explained. The 
following section depicted Austrian economics. The analysis in the main part referred 
to a qualitative assessment of Austrian economics in regard to criteria from the phi-
losophy of science, potential applications of Austrian economics and its powers to 
derive implications to influence transaction processes. 
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Figure 1: The ‘Triangular problem’ of novelty, truth, and empirical content. 
Source: According to Chmielewicz, K. (1994), p. 131. 
Figure 2: Differences between explanation and prognosis (Example in brackets). 
Source: According to Schanz, G. (1988), p. 66. 
Figure 3: Six potential outcomes of the market process. 
Source: According to Plinke, W. (2000), p. 60. 
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